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Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure
by John 0. Cole*
and
Bonnie K. Cole**
In reading over 900 cases in criminal law and criminal procedure
during the survey period, the fact that courts find the time to carefully
analyze the allegations of error in each case is striking. The difference
in the quality of the courts' work is especially striking when compared
to the courts of twenty years ago.
Several themes emerge after reading these cases. The first theme is
the number of specious arguments raised on appeal.' This is due, in
2
large part, to the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Huguley v. State
in which the court disapproved Anders motions' and forced attorneys to
raise arguments on appeal no matter how specious.4 The second theme
is the number of cases courts disposed of without deciding the merits
because the claims were waived by failure to raise them at the trial
level.5 Waiver of claims is tied to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, which are given all too short a shrift by appellate courts. The
third theme is a determination of harmless error, which leaves the
* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Duke
University (A.B., 1958); Indiana University (M.A., 1962); University of Pennsylvania (J.D.,
1970).
** Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Walker P. Johnson, Jr. and the Honorable Tommy
Day Wilcox, Bibb County Superior Court, Macon Judicial Circuit (1987-1988). University
of North Florida (B.A., 1977); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D.,
1987). Member, Mercer Law Review (1985-1987); Student Writing Editor (1986-1987).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See, e.g., In re J.M., 276 Ga. 88, 88, 575 S.E.2d 441, 442 (2003).
2. 253 Ga. 709, 324 S.E.2d 729 (1985).
3. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
4. Huguley, 253 Ga. at 710, 324 S.E.2d at 730-31.
5. See, e.g., Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 885-87, 572 S.E.2d 612, 615-16 (2002);
Lyons v. State, 258 Ga. App. 9, 13, 572 S.E.2d 632, 636 (2002).
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convicted appellant without a remedy even in cases of clear error in the
trial process.'
The supreme court reviewed waiver, ineffective assistance, and
Defendant was
harmless error claims in Braithwaite v. State.7
malice
murder,
three counts of
convicted by a jury of "three counts of
felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of
illegal firearm possession."8 The prosecutor began his closing argument
as follows:
Two 18-year-old kids, sleeping in their house, never done anything
wrong, not bothering anybody, engaged to be married, recent graduates
from high school, both working, promising careers, maybe college.
What must it have been like to be in that bedroom, minding your
own business when five men come in there, order you get down face
first? Do you scream? Well, they couldn't do that because they'd
stuffed socks in their mouth. Do you fight back? These men have
guns.
What must it be like laying there next to the man you love, your face
covered up so you can't see but you can hear everything? What must
it be like when that first shot was fired into Eddie Fleming's [sic] back
and she's laying there right next to him? And he can still talk. He can
still move his head and she has to sit there and listen. And then they

wait.
And what must it be like while the men are deciding who the next shot

is going to be fired from? She's laying there waiting. The blood is
pouring out of Eddie's back, who's right next to her. The men decide.
A second shot is fired-she's inches away from it-into the head of
Eddie McMillian.
What must it have been like for Eddie McMillian as he lay paralyzed? And then what was it like when Nekeba Turner as she lay
there waiting for her turn to die?

What was it like for Chauncey Fleming as he lay there all tied up
listening to his friends being killed knowing his turn is coming? And

one last piece of worthless metal takes Chauncey's life. I mean the last
images anybody has of him is laying there tied up at the ankles and
the arms and around the head.
And what must it be like to be Eddie McMillian's mother and find
those bodies?9

6.
App.
7.
8.
9.

See, e.g., Braithwaite, 275 Ga. at 886, 572 S.E.2d at 616; Shirley v. State, 259 Ga.
503, 505, 578 S.E.2d 163, 165 (2003).
275 Ga. 884, 885-89, 572 S.E.2d 612, 615-18 (2002).
Id. at 884 n.1, 572 S.E.2d at 614 n.1.
Id. at 893-94, 572 S.E.2d at 621.

2003]

CRIMINAL LAW

Defendant's attorney did not object to this portion of the closing
argument, which clearly violates the proscription against a "golden rule"
argument-an argument that asks the jurors to place themselves in the
victim's shoes. Because no objection was made and because the issue
could not be raised on appeal, appellant was forced to rely on an
ineffective assistance claim to make his point.' Every defense lawyer
knows an ineffective assistance claim is easy to allege, but it is nearly
impossible to prove in our current legal climate.
The majority rejected appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel
argument."
Appellant's trial counsel recognized the golden rule
violation but chose to ignore the violation and hoped that the jury would
ignore it also." The majority found that defense counsel's choice was
a reasonable strategy and refused to second guess the defense counsel's
decision.' 3 In addition, the majority held that the error in allowing this
golden rule violation was harmless because the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming.' 4
Justice Hunstein, dissenting with Justices Benham and Thompson,
objected strongly to the majority's all-too-typical brushing aside of an
ineffective assistance claim." As Justice Hunstein saw it:
The argument quoted above reveals that the prosecutor repeatedly
and deliberately encouraged the jurors to place themselves in the
murder victims' place and imagine for themselves what it must have
been like as the crimes occurred, as the victims lay there helpless while
shots were fired and friends and loved ones were murdered. The
prosecutor even called upon the jurors to imagine themselves in the
place of the mother of the murder victim who discovered the bodies.
This language was not merely "vivid imagery of what a victim
experienced" during a crime, as the concurrence would characterize it,
but rather constituted an impermissible golden rule argument that
"invited [jurors] to place themselves in the victim's place in regard to
the crime itself." Under these circumstances there can be no question
that the prosecutor's use of a golden rule argument was error.
I do not agree with the majority that error by trial counsel is
unreviewable merely because the error was intentional. A deliberate
decision by trial counsel can constitute deficient performance just as
easily as an inadvertent lapse. Invoking the words "tactics" and
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 885-86, 572 S.E.2d at 615-16.
Id. at 886-87, 572 S.E.2d at 616.
Id. at 886, 572 S.E.2d at 615.
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. at 895, 572 S.E.2d at 622 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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"strategy" does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a
claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same
"Tactics" and "strategy" provide no talismanic
circumstances.
protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Nor can
invoking the phrases "hindsight" and "second-guessing" justify an
appellate court's failure to perform its function as a reviewing court to
determine whether the "tactical judgment of [trial counsel] was outside
the wide range of reasonably effective assistance."
Applying the appropriate analysis to this case, trial counsel's
decision to remain silent in the face of the prosecutor's prolonged and
egregious golden rule argument was a decision no reasonable defense
counsel would have made under the same circumstances ....
There was no reasonable tactical advantage to remaining silent in
the face of a golden rule argument that inaccurately informed the jury
that it was fair and proper for them to review the evidence from the
perspective of the crime victims and their families. There was no
reasonable tactical advantage to be gained by abetting the State's
deliberate strategy to subvert the jury's duty to render a fair and
impartial verdict based upon an objective application of the law to the
facts. No reasonable attorney hearing this prolonged and egregious
violation of the rule against golden rule arguments would remain silent
because no reasonable attorney under the same circumstances would
believe that a jury would "ignore" this persuasive but improper
argument. Certainly no reasonable attorney could possibly believe any
injury to his client would result from "drawing attention" to a
misleading
and damagingly erroneous standard of evidentiary
16
review.
Unlike the majority, Justice Hunstein did not find the evidence of guilt
overwhelming.17 The evidence against appellant was based on three
witnesses. Witnesses Davis and Ward were involved in the crime and
testified in exchange for reduced sentences. The other witness was
Davis's lover and appellant's adulterous wife. 8 Because there was no
other evidence of appellant's guilt, Justice Hunstein thought the
evidence, while sufficient to support a conviction, was far from overwhelming.19 As the Justice stated:
As the majority's holding in this case amply demonstrates, "overwhelming evidence" no longer depends upon the amount and quality
of evidence of guilt adduced at trial. Instead, "overwhelming evidence"

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 894-97, 572 S.E.2d at 621-23 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 898-99, 572 S.E.2d at 624-25 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 624 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 899, 572 S.E.2d at 624-25 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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has become the catch phrase that excuses all error. No matter how
excessive the argument or how impassioned the prosecutor's plea, all
is forgiven because "overwhelming evidence" was adduced. Despite the
perversion this makes of our Court's rulings, the continued abuse it
encourages among prosecutors, and the hypocrisy it foments between
words and deeds, the bottom line is that when the evidence adduced at
trial meets the [minimum sufficiency] standard, this Court will not
reverse a criminal conviction over a prosecutor's use of any golden rule
argument, no matter how extensive or damaging that argument is.
It is well established in Georgia that use of a golden rule argument
is strictly prohibited. Why, then, do prosecutors continue repeatedly
to make these forbidden arguments? The answer is simple: this Court
does not hold them accountable for their violation of our rulings. We
gum the words of prohibition but there are no teeth to nip prosecutors
into obedience. I cannot condone this Court's abandonment of its
obligation "to ensure that no infringement of the accused's fair trial
rights has occurred" through the use of a prohibited golden rule
argument ... in favor of a rubber stamp approach to the State's
improper behavior. Nor can I condone the continuing violations of
prosecutorial duty, propriety and restraint in regard to the prohibited
use of golden rule arguments.20
Considering Justice Hunstein's points, the court should revise its
cavalier attitude toward both ineffective assistance claims and the
harmless error doctrine.
The case is also notable for Justice Sears's excellent analysis of what
constitutes a golden rule argument and why such arguments are
prohibited.21
I.
A.

PRE-TRIAL MATTERS

Medical Records

In King v. State,22 the Gwinnett County Solicitor-General's Office
charged King with driving under the influence and failure to maintain
a single lane. The State obtained a search warrant for all medical
records related to King's treatment at the Gwinnett Medical Center at
the time of the incident."
King argued that the medical records
seizure "violated his right to privacy under the due process clause of the

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 899-900, 572 S.E.2d at 625 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 889-93, 572 S.E.2d at 618-21 (Sears, P.J., concurring).
276 Ga. 126, 577 S.E.2d 764 (2003).
Id. at 126-27, 577 S.E.2d at 764-65.
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Georgia Constitution as held in King v. State."24 In the first King case,
the court required the State to give defendant notice and an opportunity
to object to a subpoena before the records could be produced.2 5 In the
second King case, defendant sought to extend the court's first King
ruling to encompass a search warrant for medical records in addition to
a subpoena for medical records. The trial court disagreed, 26 and the
supreme court affirmed.
The court, in the first (unrelated) King case, established a fundamental right to privacy for medical records.28 Thus, the State needs a
compelling reason to intrude on this privacy right, and the intrusive
means used should be narrowly tailored to that compelling state
interest. 29 The statutory authority 0 for the subpoena in the first King
case had no defined limits, was not narrowly tailored to the compelling
interest of detecting crime, and was, thus, invalid.31 However, in the
second King case, the court held that a search warrant, because of
constitutional and statutory limitations, is a device narrowly tailored to
3 2
the compelling interest of detecting criminal activity.
Therefore, no
notice or opportunity to be heard was required even in an area with a
strong and fundamental privacy interest in the medical records.33
B.

Home Searches

In Lyons v.State, 4 police officers sought a search warrant based on
the following affidavit:
The confidential and reliable informant has stated that they have seen
a quantity of cocaine under the control and possession of Claude Lyons
in the recent past. Said informant states that the quantity of cocaine
seen at [the apartment] was in excess of several ounces. Informant
further states that Claude Lyons uses this residence at 3012 11th Ave
Apt C [sic], as a stash house for currency from narcotics sales and
narcotics. Said informant is reliable in that they have given information to deponent that Claude Lyons a.k.a. "C" is a wanted fugitive from

24. Id. at 127, 577 S.E.2d at 765 (citing King v. State, 272 Ga. 788, 535 S.E.2d 492
(2000)); see GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. 1 (1998).
25. 272 Ga. at 794, 535 S.E.2d at 497.
26. 276 Ga. at 127, 577 S.E.2d at 765.

27. Id. at 129, 577 S.E.2d at 767.
28. 272 Ga. at 790, 535 S.E.2d at 495.
29. Id.
30. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-40(a) (1995).
31. 272 Ga. at 792, 535 S.E.2d at 496.
32. 276 Ga. at 128, 577 S.E.2d at 766.
33. Id. at 129, 577 S.E.2d at 767.
34. 258 Ga. App. 9, 572 S.E.2d 632 (2002).
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the State of Florida for narcotics violations for which deponent has
confirmed said information to be true. Independent investigation by
deponent has confirmed the information given by informant that
Claude Lyons does reside at 3012 11th Ave Apt C [sic] and drives a
Oldsmobile 98 GA tag 55811 QD. Informant has provided deponent
with another informant who has purchased on several occasions crack
cocaine35 from Claude Lyons a.k.a. "C" which has lead [sic] to his
arrest.
Charged with multiple counts of selling and trafficking cocaine, Lyons
moved to suppress the incriminating evidence found in his apartment.
He argued that the affidavit in support of probable cause was inadequate. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Lyons was
convicted. At trial, the defense did not object to the introduction of the
evidence found in the apartment. The defense attorney stated that she
36
had no objection to the introduction of that evidence several times.
Lyons appealed and argued that the motion to suppress should have
been granted." The court of appeals agreed and reversed his conviction.3" The court determined that the informant was not reliable based
on the face of his affidavit. 9 The affidavit's details about Lyons were
not sufficient to establish that the informant was a reliable and credible
source as to Lyons's criminal activity.40 Also, the affidavit omitted the
facts that the informant was paid for the information and that she had
never given information before. 4 '
An unidentified informant may be used without indicia of reliability
42
However, the
if the tip can be corroborated by further investigation.
corroboration must consist of details not generally available to the
public.43 In Lyons corroboration of information about the apartment
and Lyons's vehicle did not contain the kind of detail that would bolster
Therefore, the motion to suppress
the reliability of the informant."
should have been granted. 45

35. Id. at 10, 572 S.E.2d at 634.
36. Id. at 9, 572 S.E.2d at 633-34.
37. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 633.
38. Id. at 13, 572 S.E.2d at 636.
39. Id. at 11, 572 S.E.2d at 635.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11-12, 572 S.E.2d at 635 (quoting Robertson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 68, 70,
510 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1999)).
44. Id. at 12, 572 S.E.2d at 635.
45. Id. at 12-13, 572 S.E.2d at 636.
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On motion for reconsideration, the State argued that defendant waived
any objection to the search warrant because his attorney did not object
to its introduction at trial and stated that she had no objection.46 In
Kilgore v. State,4 v the supreme court stated that a defendant's objection
to the admission of evidence at trial is not necessary when a motion to
suppress has been denied.' However, in two earlier cases,49 the court
held that a defendant does waive the objections contained in an
overruled motion to suppress when defense counsel not only does not
object but also affirmatively states that there is no objection to
admission of the evidence.5 °
In Lyons the court appeared to disapprove the two earlier cases in
general terms.5 First, the court suggested that the State had waived
its argument by failing to raise it on the first appeal.52 Second, and
more importantly, the court held that even if the objection was not
waived, defense counsel could be charged with ineffective assistance of
counsel because the court could think of no reason why competent
counsel would waive objections that were raised unsuccessfully in a
motion to suppress.53 So, "[t]he inescapable conclusion is that counsel
was simply unfamiliar with the waiver law in this area. " "
5
In State v. Lejeune,"
Lejeune was charged with malice murder,
felony murder, aggravated assault, concealing the death of another, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The State
sought the death penalty. The trial court granted a motion to suppress
evidence seized from Lejeune's house and the State appealed. The trial
court also denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized from
defendant's car, and defendant appealed. 6
In Lejeune the decedent was shot in the head, dismembered, and
burned. The decedent's severed head was kept for several days and then
dumped in a lake. A month later, an attorney called the police to tell

46. Id. at 13, 572 S.E.2d at 636.
47. 247 Ga. 70, 274 S.E.2d 332 (1981).
48. Id. at 70, 274 S.E.2d at 332.
49. Abrams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 874, 242 S.E.2d 756 (1978); Carter v. State, 137 Ga.
App. 823, 225 S.E.2d 64 (1976).
50. Lyons, 258 Ga. App. at 13, 572 S.E.2d at 636.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53: Id.
54. Id. See Shivers v. State, 258 Ga. App. 253, 255, 573 S.E.2d 494, 497 (2002)
(throwing out a warrant when an informant not known to be reliable gave publicly
available details).
55. 276 Ga. 179, 576 S.E.2d 888 (2003).
56. Id. at 179, 576 S.E.2d at 890.

2003]

CRIMINAL LAW

125

them that a client had information about the homicide. The client knew
Lejeune and was interested in the $10,000 reward. The informant told
the police that Lejeune told him that Lejeune shot the deceased in the
head and dismembered the body with a hand saw. The informant stated
that the culprits decided to keep the head because the bullet was still in
it. Then the culprits purchased a can of gasoline and attempted to burn
the body parts. The informant stated that Lejeune had shown him
bloodstains on the carpet in the apartment where the crime occurred.57
The police sought a search warrant for Lejeune's apartment. They
obtained the warrant, searched the apartment, and arrested Lejeune.
Lejeune's white Corolla was parked in the apartment complex parking
lot. The police impounded the car to avoid anyone tampering with it.
About thirty-six hours later, the police asked for and received a search
warrant for the car and thoroughly searched it. 5"
The trial court found that the affidavit supporting the apartment
search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause because
[t]he affidavit was composed almost entirely of Vaughn's assertion that
Lejeune had confessed to him. Although Vaughn was a known
informant, nothing in the affidavit supported his credibility or corroborated his information. The affidavit [did] not detail any of his past
performance as an informant or any efforts by the police to verify
Vaughn's information independently.59
The supreme court agreed.6 0 "In determining whether an affidavit
sufficiently establishes the probable cause necessary for issuance of a
warrant, [the court] employ[ed] the 'totality of the circumstances'
analysis . . ., with the admonition that '[pirudence counsels that [this
analysis] be considered as the outer limit of probable cause.'"'"
The magistrate's task in determining if probable cause exists to issue
a search warrant is "simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place ... "61

57. Id. at 179-80, 576 S.E.2d at 890-91.
58. Id. at 180, 576 S.E.2d at 891.
59. Id. at 181, 576 S.E.2d at 891.
60. Id. at 182, 576 S.E.2d at 891.
61. Id. at 181, 576 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577, 422 S.E.2d
426, 429 (1992)) (citations omitted).
62. Id. (quoting DeYong v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786-87, 493 S.E.2d at 157, 165 (1997))
(citations omitted).
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This Court "has cautioned attesting officers and magistrates to 'make
every effort to see that supporting affidavits reflect the maximum
indication of reliability. .
6..,, The affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant for Lejeune's apartment did not contain any
information corroborating Vaughn's veracity and, therefore, did not
reflect the minimum required level of reliability. Since the affidavit
was composed almost exclusively of the unsupported hearsay of
Vaughn, we find that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed."
C.

Auto Search

The automobile search in Lejeune was a different matter. The State
conceded that the warrant for the car was invalid because it was issued
by a Fulton County magistrate for a search in DeKalb County. However,
the trial court validated the search using the automobile exception,
which allows an automobile search without a warrant when probable
cause to believe the automobile contains evidence of a crime exists.65
Justice Carley, speaking for a unanimous court, disagreed. 6
In an
opinion worth quoting at length for its excellent analysis of the
automobile exception to the search warrant requirement, Justice Carley
stated:
There is no evidence that this search was valid as an inventory search
or as incident to the arrest.
"The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a
warrant before conducting a search." The "automobile exception" to the
search warrant requirement is premised upon two characteristics of
automobiles. One characteristic is their "ready mobility." If the police
have probable cause, they may search a vehicle without a warrant
because "'the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily
movable.'" If the police had to take the time to secure a warrant, the
evidence or contraband would probably vanish. The second characteristic upon which the automobile exception is based is the diminished
expectation of privacy in a car. Automobiles are subject to pervasive
governmental regulation and control, especially with regard to safety
and licensing, and the "public is fully aware that it is accorded less
privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling governmental
need for regulation." However, the "automobile exception" cases do not
hold that a search warrant is never needed to search a car. There is
an automobile exception to the search warrant requirement, not an

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. (quoting Gary, 262 Ga. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 430) (citations omitted).
Id. at 181-82, 576 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 182, 576 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 183, 576 S.E.2d at 893.
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exemption. Otherwise, the Supreme Court of the United States would
have held that the police would not, under any circumstances, need to
obtain a search warrant for an automobile, provided they have probable
cause for the search. Instead, the Supreme Court explained how ready
mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile
delineate the circumstances of a permissible warrantless search:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is
readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not
regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise-the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into
play.
If the police have probable cause to search a car under the
aforementioned circumstances, "the overriding societal interests
in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before
the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable." We conclude
that the automobile exception does not apply where, as here, the
suspect's car was legally parked in his residential parking space,
the suspect and his only alleged cohort were not in the vehicle or
near it and did not have access to it, and the police seized the
automobile without a warrant, placed it on a wrecker and hauled
it away to be searched at a later date.67
In addition, the court stated that no probable cause existed to search the
car anyway.6" Thus, the court clarified that seizure of an automobile
from a private parking lot cannot be done without a warrant supported
by probable cause. 69 The seizure was invalid because the reasons for
the automobile exception did not apply to this case. °
In Wright v. State,7 the court distinguished its opinion in Lejeune.72
The court determined that police could properly impound a vehicle
belonging to the suspect when the vehicle was parked in a private
parking lot at a friend's apartment and could have been tampered with
by the friend or others.73 The court found crucial the fact that officers
knew that Wright's detention would last for some time and knew that
the car was wanted for an investigation in another county.74 Thus, an

67. Id. at 182-83, 576 S.E.2d at 892-93 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 183-84, 576 S.E.2d at 893.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 183, 576 S.E.2d at 893.
71. 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003).
72. Id. at 461-62, 579 S.E.2d at 221-22 (citing Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 576 S.E.2d 888
(2003))
73. Id.
74. Id. at 461, 579 S.E.2d at 221.
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impoundment similar to the unreasonable impoundment in Lejeune was
held to be reasonable in Wright.75
D.

Auto Stop

In State v. Thompson,7 6 Douglasville police stopped a car for swerving
into the right lane and then back again two or three times. During the
stop, the police smelled a strong odor of either detergent or air freshener
and noticed that defendant was extremely nervous. When asked why he
was so nervous, defendant answered that police made him nervous. The
officer issued a warning citation for the driving and asked defendant if
he was transporting any drugs. When the officer mentioned marijuana,
defendant became more nervous and defensive. Defendant refused to
consent to a search of the car, and the officer called in a drug dog which
arrived about twenty minutes later. Marijuana was found in a package
that smelled strongly of detergent.7 7
The trial court found that while the initial stop was valid, the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant after the officers
completed the initial traffic stop. 78 The court of appeals affirmed the
granting of the motion to suppress the marijuana, agreeing with the trial
court that nervousness alone is not enough to establish reasonable
suspicion. 79 Additionally, a strong smell of detergent could indicate an
attempt to mask the smell of marijuana but also could be the result of
many legal purposes.8 °
In Faulkner v. State,8 1 Faulkner was stopped by a police officer for
"traveling more than 300 feet in a center turn lane."82 The police
officer asked for Faulkner's license and proof of insurance and checked
the license and insurance by computer. Then, the officer returned to the
car and asked Faulkner to step out while the officer wrote a ticket for
driving in the center lane too long. The officer returned Faulkner's
license and insurance card and had Faulkner sign the ticket. While the
officer held the ticket, he asked Faulkner if he could search the vehicle.
Faulkner agreed, and the officer found a small amount of marijuana in
the truck.83

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 461-62, 579 S.E.2d at 221-22.
256 Ga. App. 188, 569 S.E.2d 254 (2002).
Id. at 188-89, 569 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 189, 569 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 190, 569 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.
256 Ga. App. 129, 567 S.E.2d 754 (2002).
Id. at 129, 567 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 129-30, 567 S.E.2d at 75.
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The trial court denied Faulkner's motion to suppress,84 but the court
of appeals reversed.85 Despite the State's argument, the court held that
no reasonable person in Faulkner's position would have felt free to leave
before receiving a copy of the ticket.8" Instead, a reasonable person
would wait for the ticket, which contains the details of the stop, the
officer's identity, and the hearing's date and time.87
Therefore, Faulkner's detention after the ticket was written was
improper.88 "An officer who questions and detains a suspect for
[reasons unrelated to the initial stop] exceeds the scope of permissible
[the officer] has reasonable suspicion of other
investigation unless
89
criminal activity."
In Duke v. State,90 the 911 center radioed a deputy that "a Mazda
RX-7, license number 342 PKE, was traveling eastbound on Highway
138 [and was suspected of drug activity.]"9 1 The deputy stopped the
Mazda and requested and received appellant's consent to search the car.
The deputy found cocaine in the car. The trial court denied appellant's
motion to suppress, and appellant appealed.92 The court of appeals
reversed and held that the State failed to meet its burden of showing
reasonable suspicion.93 The deputy was entitled to rely on the 911
information to make the stop.9 4 The deputy acted reasonably because
he relied on the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers.9"
However, the court held that the State must produce evidence from other
officers that someone had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
justify the stop.96 Here, the State failed to produce evidence other than
the arresting officer's testimony.97
In State v. Cooper,98 defendant was a passenger in an automobile
that was stopped for crossing the center line several times. The driver
was given a warning, and the officer returned her license to her. Then,

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
S.E.2d
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 129, 567 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 130, 567 S.E.2d at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130-31, 567 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 131, 567 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277, 280, 546
47, 50 (2001)).
257 Ga. App. 609, 571 S.E.2d 414 (2002).
Id. at 609, 571 S.E.2d at 415.
Id.
Id. at 610, 571 S.E.2d at 415.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 416.
Id.
Id. at 610-11, 571 S.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 610, 571 S.E.2d at 416.
260 Ga. App. 333, 579 S.E.2d 754 (2003).
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because the driver appeared nervous, the officer began a new investigation and asked the driver if she had any contraband in the car. The
driver gave consent to search the car. Before searching the car, the
officer asked Cooper, the passenger/defendant, for his identification. The
officer called in Cooper's name and found outstanding warrants against
him. The officer arrested Cooper because of the warrants. Finally, the
officer searched the car and found marijuana on the floor of the front
and rear passenger seats.99
Cooper filed a motion to suppress the marijuana, arguing that the
marijuana was the tainted fruit of the illegal detention. The "new
investigation" that began after the issuing the of warning ticket was
clearly illegal because there was no reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to further detain the car's occupants once the warning ticket was
issued. The State argued that Cooper, a passenger, lacked standing to
contest the search. The trial court found that defendant did have
standing to contest the stop of the car because of his own interest in not
being detained illegally. Thus, the trial court agreed with defendant and
granted the motion to suppress."
The court of appeals agreed that defendant had standing to assert the
stop's illegality and that the continued detention was illegal.1 ' Thus,
the arrest, which was based on obtaining defendant's identification
during an illegal detention, would seem to be tainted and a search based
on that arrest would also seem to be tainted. However, the court of
appeals, noting that defendant did not contest the illegality of the arrest,
held that the uncontested arrest attenuated the taint between the illegal
detention and the subsequent search of the car."°2 The court's analysis
was not changed by the officer's decision to search the car before
discovering the outstanding warrants.0 3
In State v. Bell,' Bell walked into a liquor store while holding and
drinking from a small glass imprinted with the name of a cognac. An
officer working at the store took the glass from Bell and ascertained that
it contained alcohol. He asked Bell for identification, and Bell returned
to his car. The officer noticed Bell reaching around on the car floor
before pulling his identification from an overhead visor. The officer
arrested Bell under a municipal ordinance that forbade alcohol
consumption near a liquor store. An "inventory" search of the car

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 333-34, 579 S.E.2d at 755-56.
Id. at 334, 579 S.E.2d at 756.
Id. at 335, 337, 579 S.E.2d at 756, 758.
Id. at 336-37, 579 S.E.2d at 757-58.
Id. at 337, 579 S.E.2d at 758.
259 Ga. App. 328, 577 S.E.2d 39 (2003).

CRIMINAL LAW

2003]

revealed a handgun and crack cocaine. The passenger, who had no
driver's license, was permitted to leave.1" 5
The trial court granted Bell's motion to suppress. The State argued
that the search was permissible incident to arrest, but the trial court
disagreed.' °6 The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, finding
no cases where a search was determined to be reasonable under the
facts presented here: where the defendant was not removed from [the]
car; where the arrest was for the violation of a municipal ordinance
completely unconnected to the car; and where no issue existed as to the
officer's safety. 07
Little discussion was required of the officer's testimony that this was
a valid inventory search because impoundment is valid only if it is
Here, no reason existed to
necessary to take charge of the property.'
impound the car, so the motion to suppress was correctly granted.' 9
In Milby v. State," ° the police stopped a truck "for failure to maintain lane.""' Defendant (Milby) was seated on the passenger side of
the truck. The driver consented to a truck search. Milby was instructed
to exit the vehicle and to place his hands on the truck. The officer
frisked Milby. The officer felt a hard object in Milby's shirt pocket that
felt like a rock of cocaine. The officer pulled out the hard object and
arrested defendant for possession of cocaine. The officer testified at the
suppression hearing that the couple in the truck seemed nervous and
that they were driving away from a drug area." 2 The officer testified
that he searched Milby because he was looking for "weapons that might
be used offensive[ly] against [the officer] and anybody else at the
scene." 1 3 The officer stated that he searched vehicle passengers
routinely because the passenger likely would "be standing outside the
vehicle behind [him] when [he was] searching."" 4
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress,"' but the
court of appeals granted an interlocutory appeal and reversed." 6 The

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 328-29, 577 S.E.2d at 40.
Id. at 329-30, 577 S.E.2d at 41.
Id.
Id. at 330, 577 S.E.2d at 41.

Id.
256 Ga. App. 429, 569 S.E.2d 256 (2002).
Id. at 430, 569 S.E.2d at 257.
Id., 569 S.E.2d at 257-58.
Id., 569 S.E.2d at 258.
Id.
Id. at 429, 569 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 432, 569 S.E.2d at 259.
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was
court held that the officer had no basis to conclude that defendant
117
armed and dangerous and thus subject to a pat-down frisk.
As the court stated:
A Terry pat-down involves a two-step process. "The officer must pat
down first and then intrude beneath the surface only if he comes upon
something which feels like a weapon."
But, "[i]mplicit in this rule of law... is the prerequisite determination that the officer actually concluded that the suspect was armed or
a threat to personal safety and the officer can articulate a basis for his
conclusion so that a Terry protective pat-down would not be unreasonable in the given set of circumstances." [The court has] held that such
a practice was reasonable when the defendant was a passenger in a car
that was reported stolen, when the passenger exhibits aggressive
behavior toward the officer, and where drug use is admitted and one
of the car's occupants is known to be involved in the drug trade.
An individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment are not
automatically waived, however, simply because he or she is asked
to step out of a vehicle. The safety of officers is of extreme
importance to this Court. Nonetheless, our constitution requires
an officer to provide evidence to show that an act alleged to be
performed for his safety was actually performed for that purpose
in conformance with the requisite standards of Terry. Without
appropriate evidence that the "officer.. . had a reasonable basis
for concluding that (the suspect subject to the search) was armed
or was otherwise a threat to his personal safety," the intrusive
search of the type in this case is unconstitutional.'

E. Roadblocks
In State v. Ayers," 9 defendant was stopped at a roadblock, and
incriminating evidence was found in the car.1 2' Defendant filed a
motion to suppress, and at the hearing the officer testified as follows:
[A: Officer] The license safety checkpoint allows us to check mass
quantities of vehicles at one location so that-and we enforce all of the
laws of the state of Georgia and the county ordinances.
[Q: Defense counsel]: What I wanted to focus on is, is what you're
saying is that the means of enforcing the law is setting up the license
checkpoint; but the purpose of the roadblock is general law enforcement?

117. Id. at 431, 569 S.E.2d at 258.
118. Id. at 430-31, 569 S.E.2d at 258-59 (citations omitted).
119. 257 Ga. App. 117, 570 S.E.2d 603 (2002).
120. Id. at 118, 570 S.E.2d at 603-04.
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[A:] Absolutely. There's no-there are no specific reasons that we
stop and check. We check everything, license, insurance. We walk
around behind and check the tag. Of course, we talk to the people ....
[Q:] General law enforcement?
[A:] Every law. It doesn't matter...
[Q:] And the primary purpose of this checkpoint was not just
licenses?
[A:] That's correct.
[Q:] It was general law enforcement?
[A:] It was-yes. Enforce all the laws of the state of Georgia ....
[Q:] You did not pick out any particular primary purpose other than
general law enforcement?
[A:] Nope.' 2 '
The trial court granted defendant's motion,'22 and the court of
appeals affirmed.' 23 The court cogently discussed the law of setting
roadblocks in general and sensibly stated, "[The court has] 'never
approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, [the] checkpoint
cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a
seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized
24
suspicion.'"1
F

Boat Search

The Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 52-725125 provides:
(a) Any person empowered to enforce this article and any rule or
regulation adopted pursuant hereto shall have the authority to stop
and board any vessel subject to this article or any such regulation for
the purpose of inspection or determining compliance with this
article....
(b) An officer empowered to enforce this article shall have the power:
(4) To board vessels in use, for purposes of examining any documents
126
and safety equipment.

121.
122.
123.
124.
(2000)).
125.
126.

Id., 570 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 117, 570 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 119, 570 S.E.2d at 605.
Id., 570 S.E.2d at 604 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41
O.C.G.A. § 52-7-25 (1997).
Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

134

[Vol. 55

In Peruzzi v. State,127 six rangers from the Georgia Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR") operated under auspices of that statute. The
rangers took three boats onto Lake Peachtree in Fayette County to
conduct boat safety inspections. The rangers intended to stop all boats
on the lake if possible. A ranger stopped defendant for a safety
inspection and noticed the odor of alcohol. The ranger removed
defendant from his boat and ascertained through testing that defendant
was intoxicated. The ranger arrested defendant. At trial defendant
argued that O.C.G.A. section 52-7-25 authorizes suspicionless stops in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment and therefore, his initial seizure
12
was invalid.

1

129
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in Peruzzi.
The court analogized boat stops to the typical roadblock case. 3 ° As
the court stated:

"A roadblock is satisfactory where [(1)] the decision to implement the
roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers
in the field; [(2)] all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle
stops; [(3)] the delay to motorists is minimal; [(4)] the roadblock
operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and [(5)] the
screening officer's training and experience is sufficient to qualify him
to make an initial determination
as to which motorists should be given
31
field tests for intoxication."'
132
The court found that the ranger's inspections met the five factors.

The decision to conduct safety and registration inspections on Lake
Peachtree during the holiday was made by the Fayette County
Marshal, not the officers conducting the inspections. The rangers' goal
was to "do safety checks of every boat on the lake," limiting their
individual discretion in the process. The rangers were in uniform and
in boats clearly marked as "DNR Law Enforcement." Unlike cars
traveling upon a public road, boats on an open body of water such as
Lake Peachtree originate from a large number of docks and launches
and need not follow any particular path. A roadblock is clearly
infeasible133and the emphasis in this case is on the procedural aspects of
the stop.

127. 275 Ga. 333, 567 S.E.2d 15 (2002).
128. Id. at 333-34, 567 S.E.2d at 15-16.
129. Id. at 336, 567 S.E.2d at 17.
130. Id. at 335, 567 S.E.2d at 16-17.
131. Id. at 335 n.2, 569 S.E.2d at 16 n.2 (quoting Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 161-62,
510 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1998)).
132. Id. at 335, 567 S.E.2d at 16.
133. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 16-17.
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The court also emphasized that a growing number of states allow boat
stops without individualized suspicion.'
G.

Plain View

In State v. Tye,"3 ' the decedent was stabbed to death in her home.
Defendant, Clarence Tye, was the victim's neighbor. Tye was standing
on his porch when police officers approached him. Under questioning,
Tye admitted that he had had an intimate relationship with the victim.
Tye said that the visible stains on his pants and shoes were blood stains
from a finger he had cut. The officers asked him if they could take his
shoes, and he consented. Tests showed that the blood was a mixture of
defendant's blood and the victim's blood. The trial court initially leaned
toward denying defendant's motion to suppress, but, two years later,
that Tye's consent to the officers'
granted the motion on the ground 136
taking the shoes was not voluntary.
The State appealed arguing that the consent was valid and that
consent was not even needed because the blood on Tye's shoes was in
plain view and subject to seizure without a warrant.13 7 The supreme
court concluded that under the clearly erroneous standard, the trial
However, the
court did not err in finding a lack of valid consent.13
court reversed the grant of the motion to suppress on the grounds that
Tye's shoes were in plain view and could be seized without a warrant.'39 Holding that the officers were in a place that the officers had
a right to be, questioning the victim's next-door neighbor on his porch,
and that the blood on Tye's shoes was "immediately apparent" as
possible evidence of the crime, the court allowed the seizure and blood
test."4 The officer was authorized to be "on the defendant's porch and
not in his house."'
H.

Fifth and Sixth Amendments

In Woodard v. State,'42 defendant was arrested for armed robbery.
Counsel was appointed to represent defendant at a first appearance
hearing. Two days after the hearing, a detective came to the jail and

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id., 567 S.E.2d at 17.
276 Ga. 559, 580 S.E.2d 528 (2003).
Id. at 559-60, 580 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 562, 580 S.E.2d at 731.
Id.
Id. at 563, 580 S.E.2d at 532.
Id.
Id. at 560, 580 S.E.2d at 529.
256 Ga. App. 464, 568 S.E.2d 528 (2002).
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interrogated defendant. Defendant was warned and signed a written
waiver of his Miranda rights. Defendant made a statement about his
involvement in the crime that was used against him at trial after the
trial court denied a motion to suppress. At the motion to suppress
hearing, the trial court did not believe defendant's testimony that he had
asked to speak with his attorney prior to the interrogation. 1 The
court of appeals reversed and held that although the record did not
indicate clearly that defendant had requested an attorney at his first
appearance hearing, the appointment of an attorney made defendant's
attorney request a reasonable assumption.'" Thus, the interrogation
initiated by the police was a clear violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and was not considered harmless error by the court of
appeals."'
I.

ConstitutionalPrivacy
In the noteworthy case of In re J. M.,1" the supreme court applied

the right to sexual privacy announced in Powell v. State. 47

Two

sixteen-year-olds were found engaging in sexual intercourse in the young
girl's bedroom. The two had attempted to block the bedroom door with
a stool. The girl's mother came in and caught them in the act. The
young boy jumped out of the window and fled. Although the parents did
not pursue charges against the boy, the State initiated delinquency
proceedings, and the boy was adjudicated a delinquent.'" In Powell
the supreme court "held that the Georgia Constitution prohibits the
State from criminalizing 'private, unforced, non-commercial acts of
sexual intimacy between persons legally able to consent.'""' The court
in In re J. M. held that Powell controlled and reversed the juvenile
court's delinquency finding because sixteen-year-olds in Georgia are
The State argued that the boy had no
legally able to consent. 5
privacy right in someone else's home, but the court held that argument
to be specious.'' While the State might be able to assert a compelling
interest, such as restricting commercial sexual activity, no compelling
interest was present.'52 The State's asserted interest in protecting
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 464-65, 568 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 465-66, 568 S.E.2d at 529-30.
Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
276 Ga. 88, 573 S.E.2d 441 (2003).
Id. at 89, 573 S.E.2d at 443; see Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
In re J.M., 276 Ga. at 88-89, 573 S.E.2d at 442-43.
Id. at 89, 573 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Powell, 270 Ga. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90, 573 S.E.2d at 444.

2003]

CRIMINAL LAW

minors could not override the privacy interest involved in this case
because the general assembly has established
that sixteen-year-olds are
1 53
capable of consenting to sexual intercourse.
II.
A.

CRIMES

Voluntary Manslaughter

In Shirley v. State,154 Perry Shirley appealed his voluntary manslaughter conviction with a single enumeration of error-"that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that it could infer the intent to kill
from the use of a deadly weapon." 55 The charge was given as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, you may infer that a person of sound mind and
discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences
of that person's intentional act. And if a person of sound mind and
discretion, intentionally and without justification, uses a deadly
weapon or instrumentality in the manner in which the weapon or
instrumentality is ordinarily used and thereby causes the death of a
human being, you may infer the intent to kill. Whether or not you
make56any such inference is a matter solely within the discretion of the
1
jury.
Although the charge was a correct statement of the law at the time,
the supreme court changed the law in 2001, holding that such a charge
is error."' The court of appeals noted that the supreme court gave no
rationale for this change in Georgia law.'58 "Nonetheless, we are
bound by the holdings of the [slupreme [c]ourt whether or not the
rationale for the result is contained in the decision."' 59
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that it could not "be said
that it was highly improbable that the improper charge did not
contribute to the jury's verdict," 6 ° the court held the error harmless
and avoided letting defendant off the hook.' 6' The court decided "that
the evidence of malice was not weak and that it is highly probable that

153. Id. at 90-91, 573 S.E.2d at 444. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a) (2003) (stating that a
person commits statutory rape by having sexual intercourse with someone less than sixteen

years old).
154. 259 Ga. App. 503, 578 S.E.2d 163 (2003).
155.

Id. at 503, 578 S.E.2d at 163.

156. Id. at 504, 578 S.E.2d at 164.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. (citing Harris v. State, 273 Ga. 608, 610, 543 S.E.2d 716, 717 (2001)).
Id. at 504-05, 578 S.E.2d at 164.
Id. at 505, 578 S.E.2d at 164.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 164-65.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 165.
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in charging the jury did not
the error the trial judge committed
162
contribute to the judgment."
In Prather v. State,"e a jury convicted defendant of voluntary
manslaughter, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime,
and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Defendant appealed, alleging
that a fatal variance existed between his original indictment, which
charged him with murder and possession of a firearm during the
commission of the murder, and the trial evidence on the charge of
possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime. The jury found
him guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and
of possession of a firearm. Defendant's position on appeal was that he
could not be found guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a murder when the jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter and not murder.'
The appellate court held that under established case law, when the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a trier of fact can find the
defendant guilty of a crime included in the crime charged in the
indictment, even when that crime is not specifically charged. 6 '
Therefore, the jury was authorized to convict defendant of the lesser
However, the court
included voluntary manslaughter offense."'
further held that the voluntary manslaughter conviction was mutually
exclusive of a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of murder.'67 Therefore, defendant could not be convicted of the
crime as alleged in the indictment.lr* The court could not find any
specific authority on whether the jury was authorized to convict
defendant of firearm possession during the commission of voluntary
manslaughter. 169 The court decided that it was not necessary to reach
that issue because the court held that the jury charge authorized the
jury to convict the defendant of firearm possession only during the
commission of murder. 7 ° The court reversed because no instruction
identified voluntary manslaughter as a felony, and, thus, the possession
charge could not be based on the voluntary manslaughter offense.' 7 '

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. (applying the holding from Harris,273 Ga. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 717).
259 Ga. App. 441, 576 S.E.2d 904 (2003).
Id. at 441-43, 576 S.E.2d at 905-06.
Id. at 442, 576 S.E.2d at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 442-43, 576 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 443, 576 S.E.2d at 906.
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Attempt

In Lopez v. State, 172 Lopez, a forty-six-year-old janitor at the local
mall, was smitten with a fifteen-year-old girl who worked at the mall's
McDonald's. Lopez spoke little English but visited the restaurant twice
daily to try to talk to the girl. When Lopez gave her money, he placed
it in her hand or in her front pants pocket. The girl accepted some
money, but later she refused to accept Lopez's money. 173 Lopez came
up to her on one occasion and handed her a note with a picture of a
couple kissing and the inscriptions: "The La Girlfriend," "I love you-alot," and "I want to make love to you."'174

Lopez
was convicted of
75

criminal attempt to commit child molestation.
On appeal Lopez argued that his "crude or boorish" 76 behavior was
not an attempt because there was no evidence of a "substantial step"
toward the commission of child molestation.17 7 The court, surprisingly,
held Lopez's behavior had gone beyond mere preparation and constituted
a substantial step toward the crime.17 The court cited Wittschen v.
State 7 9 as authority for its holding.8 0 In Wittschen the court held
that defendant, who offered two girls money to let him put his hands
down their pants had taken a substantial step toward child molestation. '' The facts in Lopez seem a far cry from Wittschen's attempt
and raise the question of how far back into "flirtatious" and inappropriate behavior the court will go to find an attempt crime.

172. 258 Ga. App. 92, 572 S.E.2d 736 (2002).
173. Id. at 93, 572 S.E.2d at 736-37.
174. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 737.
175. Id. at 92, 572 S.E.2d at 736. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 16-4-1, "[a] person
commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he
performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
crime." O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 (2003). And, "[a] person commits the offense of child molestation
when he or she does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child
under the age of [sixteen] years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of
either the child or the person." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) (2003).
176. Lopez, 258 Ga. App. at 94, 572 S.E.2d at 737.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 95, 572 S.E.2d at 738.
179. 259 Ga. 448, 383 S.E.2d 885 (1989).
180. Lopez, 258 Ga. App. at 94, 572 S.E.2d at 737-38.
181. Wittschen, 259 Ga. at 449, 383 S.E.2d at 887.
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C. Cocaine Laws
8 2 the supreme court addressed a state law
In Brown v. State,"
anomaly governing the possession or selling of any "imitation controlled
substance." 88 Brown sold imitation crack cocaine to a police informant4
and was charged and convicted under O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30.1,'1
which makes it a felony for any "person knowingly to manufacture,
deliver, distribute, dispense, possess with intent to distribute, or sell a
noncontrolled substance upon... the express or implied representation
that the substance is a narcotic or nonnarcotic controlled substance."" 5
However, O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30.2'86 states that it is a misdemeanor when any person "knowingly manufactures, distributes, or possesses
with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance.""8 7 Previously, the supreme court had held that section 30.2 was not always a
The court recognized,
lesser included offense of section 30.1.8
circumstances, the same evidence could be
however, that under some 89
used to prove both crimes.
In Brown a police detective testified that the overall appearance of the
substance Brown sold him was consistent with crack."9 The supreme
court concluded that the jury, using the same evidence, could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's sale violated both statutory
sections. 191
As the court stated:

"Where any uncertainty develops as to which penal clause is applicable,
the accused is entitled to have the lesser of the two penalties administered." This principle is frequently referred to as the rule of lenity,
which the United States Supreme Court has described as a "junior
version of the vagueness doctrine-the doctrine that bars enforcement
of criminal statutes that are too vague for people of common intelligence to understand. Because the same conduct constituted both a
felony and a misdemeanor, the rule of lenity requires that Brown be

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

276 Ga. 606, 581 S.E.2d 35 (2003).
Id. at 607, 581 S.E.2d at 36. See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.2 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.1 (2003).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.2.
Id.
State v. Burgess, 263 Ga. 143, 145-46 n.6, 429 S.E.2d 252, 253 n.6 (1993).
Id.
Brown, 276 Ga. at 608-09, 581 S.E.2d at 37.
Id. at 608, 581 S.E.2d at 37.
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subjected to the penalties for the misdemeanor, rather than the felony.
Accordingly, we reverse Brown's felony conviction.'92
D.

Driving Under the Influence ("DUI")

In Baird v. State,9 ' the court of appeals reversed a DUI conviction
that was based on an erroneous charge and rejected the State's
argument that the error was harmless.'9 4 The deputy sheriff pulled
over defendant, and defendant admitted that he had consumed three
beers earlier that day. After the deputy arrested defendant and read
him his implied consent rights,'95 defendant refused to take a breath
test.' 9
Defendant was charged with "driving under the influence to the extent
that it was less safe for him to drive and with failure to maintain
lane." 97 The jury found defendant guilty of DUI but not guilty of
failure to maintain a lane. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court improperly instructed the jury about the inference that could
be drawn from his refusal to take the intoxilyzer test.1 9 The judge
charged the jury as follows:
In any criminal trial the refusal of the defendant to permit chemical
analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine or other bodily
substance at the time of his arrest shall be admissible as evidence
against him. I further charge you that the refusal itself may be
considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test
would show the presence of alcohol or other prohibited substances
which impaired his driving. However, such an inference may be
rebutted."'
Although O.C.G.A. section 40-6-392(d) 200 provides that a defendant's
refusal to submit to chemical testing of a bodily substance is admissible
as evidence against him, the appellate court held that the jury instructions were outside the statute's purview because the charge instructed

192. Id. at 608-09, 581 S.E.2d at 37 (citations omitted).
193. 260 Ga. App. 661, 580 S.E.2d 650 (2003).
194. Id. at 664, 580 S.E.2d at 653.
195. In Cooper v.State, No. 50301074,203 Ga. LEXIS 671 (July 14, 2003), the supreme
court declared that Georgia's Implied Consent statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 (2001), violated
the Georgia and United States constitutions because probable cause was not required for
chemical testing. 203 Ga. LEXIS 671, at *1. The decision is not final until the rehearing
period ends. See GA. RULEs OF CT. ANN. 27, 60.
196. Baird,260 Ga. App. at 661-62, 580 S.E.2d at 651-52.
197. Id. at 662, 580 S.E.2d at 652.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d) (2001).
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the jurors that they could infer from a refusal of chemical testing that
the test would have shown the presence of alcohol or other prohibited
substances.20'
The court noted that individual responses to alcohol
vary and that the presence of alcohol in the body, by itself, does not
support an inference that defendant was an impaired driver." 2
Because the charge could have misled the jury into thinking that the
State met its burden of proof simply by showing the refusal," 3 the
appellate court rejected the State's argument that any error in the
charge was harmless."°
Omar Rodriguez, defendant in Rodriguez v. State,2"5 appealed his
drunk driving conviction, claiming that because he was not given his
implied consent waivers in Spanish, his constitutional rights, as a nonEnglish-speaking defendant, were violated. He contended that the
results of his blood-alcohol tests should have been suppressed because
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-103,206 violated equal protection. Section 24-9103 requires police officers to attempt to obtain a qualified interpreter
to inform a hearing-impaired person of his implied consent warnings, but
the section does not require an officer to attempt to obtain an interpreter
for non-English speaking persons.20 7
The appellate court held that defendant's equal protection claims were
without merit. 20 8 Defendant was not similarly situated to a hearingimpaired person because a hearing-impaired person physically could not
learn to understand an implied consent warning read to them in
English, whereas defendant had the potential to understand such a
warning. 209 Defendant failed to show that the implied consent laws
were enacted or applied with a discriminatory purpose.210 Although
defendant was similarly situated to English-speaking drivers, a language
classification was not a suspect classification, so defendant failed to meet
his burden of establishing that he was similarly situated to members of
the class who were treated differently.21' Furthermore, the govern-

201. Baird, 260 Ga. App. at 663, 580 S.E.2d at 653.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 664, 580 S.E.2d at 653. The court noted that "although the evidence of [the
defendant's] impairment was sufficient to support the DUI conviction, it was not
overwhelming." Id.
204. Id. at 663-64, 580 S.E.2d at 653.
205. 275 Ga. 283, 565 S.E.2d 458 (2002).
206. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-103 (1995).
207. Rodriguez, 275 Ga. at 283-85, 565 S.E.2d at 459-60.
208. Id. at 285, 565 S.E.2d at 460.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 284-85, 565 S.E.2d at 460.
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mental procedures had a rational basis.2 12 Even though the court
conceded that defendant correctly pointed out that the statute did not
provide accommodation for non-English-speaking persons arrested for
DUI, the court concluded "that the disparate treatment does not violate
equal protection."2 13
Defendant also argued
that reading his implied consent rights to him in English and not in
Spanish violated his right to equal protection, as an English-speaking
defendant would have understood his rights whereas he did not. [H]e
contend[ed] that under O.C.G.A. [section] 40-5-67.12'4 and O.C.G.A.
[section] 40-6-392(a)(3), 215 as interpreted in State v. Tosar,216 a
police officer is required to read a driver his implied consent rights only
in English, that the statutes thus effectively classify drivers as Englishspeaking and non-English-speaking, and that the statutes treat nonEnglish-speaking drivers differently than English-speaking drivers in
that non-English-speaking drivers will not understand their implied
consent rights.
[The appellate court found that] the language of the relevant
statutes [did] not require that the implied consent rights be read only
in English, and Tosar [did not stand for that proposition.] Tosar,
instead, simply held that the [clourt of [aippeals would not require an
officer to read the rights to the defendant in his native language.
Thus, a police department could require its officers to read the rights
in other languages or an individual officer could do so on his own. The
statutes thus, on their face, do not create a classification. [The
statutes] only require that the implied consent rights be read to
defendants. When a statute does not create a classification on its face,
it only violates equal protection when the defendant can show the law
was enacted or applied with a discriminatory purpose. Here, [the court
found,] Rodriguez ...made no such showing.217

Rodriguez also contended "that due process requires that a driver be
meaningfully advised of the implied consent rights so that he or she can
exercise those rights in a meaningful fashion."21 The supreme court,
however, held that implied consent warnings are "a matter of legislative

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
S.E.2d
218.

Id. at 287, 565 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 284, 565 S.E.2d at 460.
O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1 (2001).
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(3) (2001).
180 Ga. App. 885, 350 S.E.2d 811 (1986).
275 Ga. at 285-86, 565 S.E.2d at 460-61 (citing Tosar, 180 Ga. App. at 888, 350
at 813).
Id. at 287, 565 S.E.2d at 462.
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grace, and due process does not require that the warnings be given in a
language that the driver understands."2 19
III.
A.

TRIAL MATTERS

Right to Counsel

In McAdams v. State,22 defendant was charged with several crimes
after he struck a United States Postal Service truck with his vehicle,
drove away, tried to elude an officer, lost control of his vehicle, and hit
another car. Alcohol tests performed at the hospital indicated an
unlawful blood-alcohol concentration (0.18 grams).
Subsequently,
defendant signed forms that waived his right to counsel. The waiver
forms contained no warnings of any dangers of self-representation.
Although the trial court tried to appoint an attorney to represent
defendant,
he rejected the court's efforts and insisted on representing
221
himself.
The court of appeals noted that the determination at trial of whether
a defendant in a misdemeanor criminal prosecution had a constitutional
right to counsel depended on whether the defendant's sentence was
actual imprisonment.2 22 Because McAdams was sentenced to eighteen
months confinement, he had a constitutional right to counsel. 223 Next,
the appellate court examined whether defendant's constitutional right
to counsel had been met. 224 "'[W]here a defendant with a constitutional right to counsel proceeds pro se, the State must show that he was
made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made
a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.'" 225 The appellate court
noted the State's "heavy burden"226 of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant through either a trial transcript or other
extrinsic evidence. 227 The court held that the trial court did not
provide defendant with the information that a criminal defendant needs
to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.2 28

219. Id. at 287-88, 565 S.E.2d at 462.
220. 258 Ga. App. 250, 573 S.E.2d 501 (2002).
221. Id. at 250-52, 573 S.E.2d at 502-03.
222. Id. at 251, 573 S.E.2d at 503.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 251-52, 573 S.E.2d at 503.
225. Id. at 251, 573 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting McCants v. State, 255 Ga. App. 133, 134,
564 S.E.2d 532, 533 (2002)).
226. Id. (quoting McCants, 255 Ga. App. at 134, 564 S.E.2d at 533).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 252, 573 S.E.2d at 503.
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The court of appeals also held that the waiver form should outline the
dangers of self-representation, including the possibility of a jail sentence,
should include notice that the rules of evidence will be enforced, should
outline strategic decisions with regard to voir dire, and should also
inform the defendant that he must strike jurors. 229 The court also
stated that the waiver form should outline the strategic decisions as to
calling witnesses, should note that the decision of exercising the right to
testify must be made by the defendant, and should note that issues must
be properly preserved and transcribed in order to be raised on appeal.230 The court also held that such an error in a waiver form was
not subject to a harmless error analysis.23 1
Kitchens v. State23 2 provides an example of a defendant winning the
battle and losing the war. The trial court convicted defendant of driving
under the influence of alcohol to the extent that she was a less safe
driver, failure to maintain lane, and driving with an expired license. 233
Defendant appealed, "arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the
results of the state-administered breath test into evidence, because the
implied consent warning read to her by the arresting officer was
misleading, inaccurate, and coercive .... ,234
The videotape of the stop and arrest showed that when the officer read
the implied consent warning, he overstated the legal limit as ten grams
instead of 0.10 grams of alcohol concentration. The officer made this
error twice. The officer also incorrectly stated the consequences of
refusal to take the test. Defendant explained her lack of understanding
and confusion about what the officer told her several times, but
3
defendant took the test. The result of the breath test was 0.199.2 5
"The trial court denied [defendant's] motion to exclude the results ...
and found her guilty of driving
under the influence to the extent that
23 6
she was a less safe driver."
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in failing to exclude
the test results.23 7 The court looked to the supreme court's opinion in
Garrett v. Department of Public Safety, 238 in which the court held that
the purpose of the implied consent law is to notify drivers of their rights

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 252-53, 573 S.E.2d at 504.
258 Ga. App. 411, 574 S.E.2d 451 (2002).
Id. at 411, 574 S.E.2d at 451.
Id.
Id. at 412, 574 S.E.2d at 452.
Id.
Id. at 413, 574 S.E.2d at 453.
237 Ga. 413, 228 S.E.2d 812 (1976).
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so that an informed decision can be made.239 In Garrett the court also
stated that when the driver is misinformed of his rights and that
misinformation may affect his decision to consent, the results of chemical
tests should be suppressed.24 °
The court in Kitchens held that because "'the consent was based at
least in part on deceptively misleading information concerning a penalty
for refusal, which the State was unauthorized to implement, [defendant]
was deprived of making an informed choice under the Implied Consent
Statute.'" 241 The court noted that it "ha[d] previously recognized that
overstatement, as opposed to understatement, of the legal limit of blood
alcohol concentration is the type of misinformation that might cause
someone to submit to testing who . . . otherwise [would not]." 42 The

court emphasized that deceptive information about the penalty for
refusing the test deprived defendant of making an informed choice. 24
Finally, the court gave no merit to the State's argument that
admission of the test results did not give rise to harmful error. 2" The
court held that the trial court "specifically relied on the test results in
reaching its conclusion that Kitchens was a less safe driver."24 "'The
test for harmful error is whether it is "highly probable" that the error
contributed to the judgment .... ,"24' Notwithstanding this holding,
the court of appeals concluded that the properly admitted evidence was
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty
of less-safe2 4DUI; 241 therefore, the court of appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction.

1

B.

Waiver of Counsel
In Helmer v. State,2 49 the court of appeals reminded all counsel that
a record is needed when the issue is waiver of the right to counsel.25 °
239. Kitchens, 258 Ga. App. at 413, 574 S.E.2d at 453 (citing Garrett, 237 Ga. at 415,
228 S.E.2d at 813).
240. Garrett, 237 Ga. at 415, 228 S.E.2d at 813. See State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,
511 S.E.2d 608 (1999); State v. Coleman, 216 Ga. App. 598, 455 S.E.2d 604 (1995).
241. Kitchens, 258 Ga. App. at 414-15, 574 S.E.2d at 453 (quoting Deckard v. State, 210
Ga. App. 421, 423, 436 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1993)).
242. Id. at 413-14, 574 S.E.2d at 453 (citing Maurer v. State, 240 Ga. App. 145, 525
S.E.2d 104 (1999)).
243. Id. at 415, 574 S.E.2d at 454.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting Head v. State, 220 Ga. App. 281, 283, 469 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1996)).
247. Id. at 416, 574 S.E.2d at 454.
248. Id.
249. 256 Ga. App. 717, 569 S.E.2d 606 (2002).
250. Id. at 717, 569 S.E.2d at 607.
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Rachel Helmer appealed her bench trial speeding conviction. She
alleged that the record failed to show a knowing waiver of the right to
counsel and the right to a jury trial. 251 The appellate court determined
that no trial transcript was prepared.2 52 The court noted an exception
to the general rule set forth in Jones v. Wharton253 that such an
omission usually prevents an appellate court from considering an
appellant's allegations of error.2 54 In Wharton the Georgia Supreme
Court held that when a defendant is on trial and faces imprisonment, a
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel attaches. 255 The waiver
of this right cannot be presumed from a silent record. 2 6 The court has
applied this rule to misdemeanor cases and also has held that "'a valid
waiver of right to trial by jury cannot be found on the sole ground that
defendant failed to request one. ' ' 2 7 In Helmer the court of appeals
noted that this rule applies even when the State appends an affidavit
from the trial judge swearing that the defendant was fully informed of
the dangers of proceeding pro se, as the State did in Helmer.2" The
judgment was therefore reversed.259
In Barnes v. State 260 defendant appealed a misdemeanor conviction
and argued that she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The court of appeals did not decide the
issue, relying on the rule that a defendant receiving a suspended or
probated sentence rather than actual imprisonment has no right to a
court-appointed attorney.2"'
The Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of a conflict between the court of appeals rulings in
Deren v. State262 and Barnes v. State.263 In Deren the court of appeals held that even if a defendant is not entitled to court-appointed
counsel, the record must show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to private counsel."
In Barnes the supreme court noted the

251. Id.
252. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 606-07.
253. 253 Ga. 82, 316 S.E.2d 749 (1984).
254. Helmer, 256 Ga. App. at 717, 569 S.E.2d at 607.
255. Wharton, 253 Ga. at 83, 316 S.E.2d at 751.
256. Helmer, 256 Ga. App. at 717, 569 S.E.2d at 607 (citing Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 316
S.E.2d 749).
257. Helmer, 256 Ga. App. at 717-18, 569 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Copeland v. State, 224
Ga. App. 402, 402, 480 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1997)).
258. Id. at 718, 569 S.E.2d at 607.
259. Id.
260. 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (2003).
261. Id.
262. 237 Ga. App. 387, 515 S.E.2d 191 (1999).
263. 250 Ga. App. 276, 549 S.E.2d 495 (2001).
264. Deren, 237 Ga. App. at 388, 515 S.E.2d at 192-93.
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United States Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. Shelton265 that
the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel is triggered when an
indigent defendant is given a probated or suspended prison sentence. 26
The Georgia Supreme Court first found that the court of appeals
ruling was stated in terms of the right to counsel in general terms and
that the court of appeals erroneously applied precedent which referred
to the right of court-appointed counsel. 267 The supreme court explained that the right to private counsel attaches in all criminal
prosecutions, not just to those resulting in imprisonment or a fine, and
this right is rooted in the Georgia Constitution.268 Thus, the issue of
waiver of right to counsel does not require the same inquiry as the issue
of right to court-appointed counsel. 2 69 The court held that the court of
appeals failed to follow the decision in Deren because it did not make a
determination of whether defendant waived her right to private
counsel.2 70 Therefore, the court reversed.27 1
The Georgia Supreme Court also looked to the United States Supreme
Court's affirmation of the ruling in Shelton that a suspended or probated
prison sentence is a "term of imprisonment" that triggers the right to
appointed counsel.272 Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
indigent defendent can be imprisoned or sentenced to a probated or
suspended prison term unless the defendant was represented by counsel
at trial. 273 The Georgia Supreme Court decided that the court of
appeals did not follow the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Shelton.274 Therefore, the court of appeals analysis of defendant's
allegations concerning his Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel
was improper.275 The court also overruled Deren and other decisions 27 6 to the extent that these cases have held that a defendant is

265. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
266. Barnes, 275 Ga. at 499, 501, 570 S.E.2d at 278.
267. Id. at 500-01, 570 S.E.2d at 279.
268. Id. at 501, 570 S.E.2d at 279.
269. Id. at 500-01, 570 S.E.2d at 279.
270. Id. at 501, 570 S.E.2d at 279.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 502, 570 S.E.2d at 279-80.
275. Id. (citing Shelton, 535 U.S. 654).
276. See generally Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (1999); State v.
Smith, 264 Ga. 634, 452 S.E.2d 90 (1994); Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 296 S.E.2d 551
(1982); Johnston v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1996); Romano v. State, 220 Ga.
App. 322, 469 S.E.2d 726 (1996); Cappelli v. State, 203 Ga. App. 79, 416 S.E.2d 136 (1992).
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entitled to court-appointed counsel only if the defendant is sentenced to
actual imprisonment.27 7
In Manning v. State,"' defendant was convicted on four counts of
burglary and one count of vandalism; subsequently, defendant appealed
his conviction and contended that the trial court "failfed] to adequately
ascertain that his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and
voluntary."279 Defendant also asserted that the trial court erred in
denying his request that his court-appointed attorney assist him at trial
during his pro se representation.2 8' The court of appeals listed the six
requirements of a valid waiver as the defendant's understanding of: (1)
the nature of the charges, (2) any lesser included offenses, (3) the range
of possible punishments, (4) possible defenses, (5) mitigating circumstances, and (6) "all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the
matter."2"'
The State has the burden to prove the six requirements.2 82 However, the court also stated that the trial court is not
required to go over each of the six factors with the defendant.2
Thus,
whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary depends on the specific
facts and circumstances in that particular case.28 4 These circumstances include the defendant's background, experience, and conduct.28 8
Applying the standards in Manning, the court held that the State had
not proven that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
right to counsel.28 8 The record revealed that defendant was aware that
he was facing considerable prison time; however, nothing in the record
indicated defendant's understanding of all six factors. 287 The court
noted that the trial court failed to discuss the six factors.28 8 Also, the
trial court's warning that the defendant was making an "unwise" and
"extremely ill-advised" decision, along with the advice that the defendant
would be handicapped in his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence,
legal procedure, and the existence of potential defenses, was not
enough. 9 The court instead pointed to the lack of discussion about

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Barnes, 275 Ga. at 502, 570 S.E.2d at 280.
260 Ga. App. 171, 581 S.E.2d 290 (2003).
Id. at 171, 581 S.E.2d at 291.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 172, 581 S.E.2d at 291.
Id., 581 S.E.2d at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

potential defenses, lesser included offenses, mitigating factors, and the
range of possible punishment.29 ° The court determined that defendant
was unfamiliar with criminal procedure because no evidence showed that
his previous jail sentence resulted from a jury trial.29 1 Also, despite
defendant's time spent in the prison library preparing for his defense,
the court did not consider him familiar with criminal procedure.2" 2
The court not only found error, but also held that it was impossible to
say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even though
the evidence against defendant was "substantial."2 9 Concurring with
the majority's decision, Judge Ruffin stated that the majority sent
"mixed messages" to the bench and bar.294 The message was mixed
because the majority set forth six factors but did not require the trial
court to review each factor.295 Judge Ruffin advised the bench that
requiring the trial court, at a minimum, to address all six factors would
be beneficial because it would ensure "careful [court] inquiry."296
C.

Venue

The supreme court stated that Graham v. State297 is "yet another
criminal case in which venue was not properly proven."298 Defendant
was tried on charges of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault, illegal firearm possession, armed robbery, and kidnapping.
After the State presented its case, defendant moved for a directed verdict
because the State's evidence did not establish venue beyond a reasonable
doubt. Defendant conceded that several prosecution witnesses testified
that the crimes occurred inside Riverdale city limits, but he argued that
this evidence did not prove that the crimes occurred in Clayton County,
the proper venue. The State requested to reopen its evidence. The trial
court subsequently took judicial notice that Riverdale is located entirely
within Clayton County. The trial court then denied defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.299
The supreme court, stating that "[v]enue is more than a mere
procedural nicety,"0 0 held that proof of venue is "essential to a crimi-

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173, 581 S.E.2d at 293 (Ruffin, P.J., concurring specially).
Id. (Ruffin, P.J., concurring specially).
Id. at 174, 581 S.E.2d at 293 (Ruffin, P.J., concurring specially).
275 Ga. 290, 565 S.E.2d 467 (2002).
Id. at 290, 565 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. at 291-93, 565 S.E.2d at 468-69.
Id. at 292, 565 S.E.2d at 469.
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nal prosecution.""0 ' Although the court conceded that the trial court
was authorized to take judicial notice of the "'local divisions of [its] own
state"'30 2 and that Riverdale is located entirely within Clayton County,
it held that judicial notice "'is not evidence, but takes the place of
evidence.'" 30 3 The court also found that the trial court complied with
all procedural prerequisites for taking judicial notice."a° However, the
court further held that because the trial court did not inform the jury of
its judicial notice of Riverdale's Clayton County location, the jury did not
court therefore concluded
have that evidence before it. 30 5 The supreme
306
that venue was not proven to the jury.
The court noted that the trial court's failure to inform the jury of the
noticed fact improperly took the issue out of the jury's hands.30 7 The
court's advice to trial judges is that they "would do well to follow Federal
Rule of Evidence 201(g),3 08 by instructing the jury that it 'may, but 30is9
not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed."
The court admonished the trial courts that although venue should rarely
be a disputed issue,
[the supreme court] recently considered a number of cases in which
venue [was] contested due solely to a lack of direct evidence of venue
is cause for great concern. Therefore, [the court] reiterate[d] Chief
Justice Fletcher's exhortation that trial courts would do well to begin
giving appropriate jury charges on venue.310
The court reversed defendant's conviction but held that double jeopardy
did not bar the State from retrying the case.31
In a similar case, Lynn v. State,3 " the supreme court reversed
defendant's conviction, holding that placing the crime at a street address
does not establish venue with the required specificity if no evidence
establishes which county contains that street address. 1 3 "Venue is a
jury question that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and for at
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Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-1-4 (2000)).
Id. (quoting D. LAKE RUMSEY, JR., AGNOR's GEORGIA EVIDENCE § 16-1 (3d ed.
Id.
Id. at 293, 565 S.E.2d at 469.
Id., 565 S.E.2d at 469-70.
Id., 565 S.E.2d at 470.
FED. R. EvD. 201(g).
Graham, 275 Ga. at 293, 565 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201(g)).
Id. at 293-94, 565 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 294, 565 S.E.2d at 470.
275 Ga. 288, 565 S.E.2d 800 (2002).
Id. at 289, 565 S.E.2d at 801.
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least the last one hundred years, this [c]ourt has reversed criminal
convictions when the State failed to prove venue." 14 The supreme
court gave advice to the bench: "One way to encourage prosecutors to
make sure they have proven venue and to alert the juries to their role
in determining venue is to instruct juries that they must find venue
beyond a reasonable doubt."115 The court "strongly" urged trial courts
to give a venue charge tailored to the particular case's facts. 16
Robinson v. State"' is another case in which the court of appeals
reversed a trial court conviction on a venue issue.31
Robinson was
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and was found guilty
in the Municipal Court of Jonesboro. The conviction was affirmed by the
Superior Court of Clayton County. The state's only venue evidence was
a police officer's testimony that the officer saw defendant driving within
the Jonesboro city limits. 31 9 Because the State did not establish the
county in which the crime was committed, the court of appeals reversed
defendant's conviction. 20
The supreme court, in State v. Kell, 32' and the court of appeals, in
Naylor v. State,322 established the proper venue for Medicaid fraud 23
and theft by taking cases, 24 respectively. The supreme court, in Kell,
held that the proper venue for Medicaid fraud committed by a fraudulent
scheme or device pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 49-4-146.1(b)(1) 325 is in
any county where an act was committed which furthered the fraudulent
transaction.3 26 In Naylor the court of appeals held that the proper
venue for a theft by taking case is any county in which the accused
exercised control over the property which is the subject of the theft.3 27

314. Id.
315. Id. at 290, 565 S.E.2d at 800.
316. Id.
317. 260 Ga. App. 186, 581 S.E.2d 285 (2003).
318. Id. at 186, 581 S.E.2d at 285.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 187, 581 S.E.2d at 286.
321. 276 Ga. 423, 577 S.E.2d 551 (2003).
322. 257 Ga. App. 899, 572 S.E.2d 410 (2002).
323. Kell, 276 Ga. at 423, 577 S.E.2d at 552.
324. Naylor, 257 Ga. App. at 900, 572 S.E.2d at 411.
325. O.C.G.A. § 49-4-146.1(b)(1) (2003).
326. Kell, 276 Ga. at 425, 577 S.E.2d at 553. In Kell the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals to the extent that the court reached another conclusion in Culver v. State,
254 Ga. App. 297, 562 S.E.2d 201 (2002) and Cash v. State, 254 Ga. App. 718, 563 S.E.2d
459 (2002). Id.
327. Naylor, 257 Ga. App. at 900, 522 S.E.2d at 411.
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Jury Selection

The court of appeals, in Foster v. State,28 limited the lengths that
judges and prosecutors can go to in rehabilitating a juror.3 29 If the
questioning is lengthy and repetitious, an appellate court may determine
answer
that the questioning is more of an instruction on the desired
33 0
than a neutral attempt to determine the juror's impartiality.
In Fostera defense attorney asked a potential juror whether she would
have a "difficult time" following the law and being fair and impartial
when the evidence would be that defendant had "about one or two" DUI
convictions. 31 ' The potential juror responded: "I don't have a problem
following the law. It's just that I don't think DUI laws are strict enough.
I think once you're convicted you should not be driving."3 32 The
potential juror further responded that she would not be able to be a fair
and impartial juror and follow the law in "this case."3 3 The prosecutor
then tried to rehabilitate her, instructing her that she had given
different answers and asking her again about the answer that she could
follow the law. The potential juror answered again that she did not have
a problem following the law, but that she was confused. The potential
juror felt "scared" because she had two children that drove. The
potential juror interrupted the prosecutor's next statement with her own
idea that once one is convicted of drunk driving, that person should
never be allowed to drive again. The prosecutor persisted in asking the
potential juror whether she could listen to the evidence and the charge.
The trial judge
interjected and twice asked the juror the "rehabilitation"
question. 3

328. 258 Ga. App. 601, 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002).
329. Id. at 608, 574 S.E.2d at 849.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 606, 574 S.E.2d at 848.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. The judge's "rehabilitation" of the juror went as follows:
Let's just put it to you as clear as I can. Okay. The state is entitled to a fair trial
just like the defense is. Would the mere fact that the defendant has had a prior
DUI or two mean that you would not be able to hear the facts of this particular
case and render a fair verdict based on the evidence that I say is okay? You know,
you get instructions from the court on what the law is but you determine the facts.
Would the fact that the defendant has had prior DUI's be so prejudicial in your
mind that you would not be able to render a fair and impartial decision in this
case?
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The potential juror told the judge that she could listen to his
instructions and that she would not be that prejudiced. 3 5 However,
she then restated her position, "[b]ut it would still be there, you know,
would still be a thought that might skew what I might would think."3 36
The prosecutor continued to ask the potential juror questions, and the
potential juror acknowledged that she understood the presumption of
innocence, the meaning of allegations, and the theory that the State has
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 37
Still, the "rehabilitation" questioning continued. The trial court
overruled defense objections.3 8 After repeated questioning of this
nature, the juror contradicted her previous responses and conceded,
though she reiterated, "I just have really strong feelings against
DUI." 39
The prosecutor persisted, "[aind that's ultimately our
question. Could you do that even though you have these strong
feelings?"m The juror yielded.34 '
When the defense attorney asked the juror whether, given her
personal feelings and beliefs about DUI, she would be able to be fair and
impartial, the juror responded,
I think I could be fair. I can listen. I mean, just because I screwed up
one time doesn't mean what I should do tomorrow based on yesterday
either. So, you know, I could listen and do it but that is like one of my
little things, you know, is DUI. 2
The defense attorney moved the court to strike the potential juror for
cause, but the trial court refused to do so and the defense used a
peremptory strike. The potential juror tried to maintain her position
and repeatedly explained her position. She was confronted with
extensive rehabilitation attempts and questions. After the fifth "goround" and under the weight of this rehabilitation pressure, the
potential 3 juror gave up and responded as the judge and prosecutor
34
wished.
In Foster the court of appeals clearly warned trial courts:

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Id. at 606-07, 574 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 607, 574 S.E.2d at 848.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 574 S.E.2d at 849.
Id.
Id. at 608, 574 S.E.2d at 850.
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In too many cases, trial courts confronted with clearly biased and
partial jurors use their significant discretion to "rehabilitate" these
jurors by asking a version of this loaded question: After you hear the
evidence and my charge on the law, and considering the oath you take
as jurors, can you set aside your preconceptions and decide this case
solely on the evidence and the law? Not so remarkably, jurors
confronted with this question from the bench almost inevitably say,
"yes." Such biased jurors likely even believe that they can set aside
their preconceptions and inclinations-certainly every reasonable
person wants to believe he or she is capable of doing so. Once jurors
affirmatively answer the "rehabilitation" question, judges usually
decide to retain these purportedly rehabilitated jurors.3"
The court of appeals reversed and reminded the trial court that "'[a]
trial judge should err on the side of caution by dismissing, rather than
trying to rehabilitate, biased jurors because, in reality, the judge is the
only person in a courtroom whose primary concern, indeed primary duty,
3 45
is to ensure the selection of a fair and impartial jury.'"
In yet another case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of new trial when defendant alleged that the trial court erred in
refusing to excuse a juror for cause.'3 4 In Ivey v. State,347 the potential juror told the court that she may be prejudiced because she had been
an armed robbery victim. Throughout the rehabilitation process, the
potential juror answered at least four times that she could not be fair
and partial. Still, the court refused to remove her for cause and invited
the prosecutor to ask additional questions. After the prosecutor grilled
her, the potential juror relented. She stated that she could wait until
she heard all the evidence and that she could vote not guilty if she
believed the State had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
addition, the court asked the potential juror to explain conflicting
answers. She restated that she did not know whether hearing the
evidence would make a difference to her because of her past experiences.

344. Id. at 605, 574 S.E.2d at 847-48 (quoting Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259, 259, 549
S.E.2d 797, 799 (2001)), affd, 275 Ga. 177, 563 S.E.2d 847 (2002). Foster can be useful to
attorneys trying civil cases because the court of appeals looked to its decision in Walls, in
which the court expressly disagreed with "the way that the 'rehabilitation' question has
become something of a talisman relied upon by trial and appellate judges to justify
retaining biased jurors." 250 Ga. App. at 259, 549 S.E.2d at 797. The court applied Walls
in Foster, 258 Ga. App. at 605, 574 S.E.2d at 848.
345. 258 Ga. App. at 608, 574 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Walls, 250 Ga. at 260, 549 S.E.2d
at 799). The dissent discussed the trial courts' broad discretion in qualifying jurors. Id.
at 610, 574 S.E.2d at 851 (Mikell, J., dissenting).
346. Ivey v. State, 258 Ga. App. 587, 574 S.E.2d 663 (2002).
347. Id. at 587, 574 S.E.2d at 664.
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The trial court resorted again to rehabilitation questioning, and the juror
yielded to it."~
As in Foster, the appellate court in Ivey admonished trial courts that
in too many cases, trial courts use their significant discretion to
rehabilitate jurors that were clearly biased and partial. 49 The court
pointed to the question, "After you hear the evidence and my charge on
the law, and considering the oath you take as jurors, can you set aside
your preconceptions and decide this case solely on the evidence and the
law?" 5 0 as an example of a version of the "loaded question." 51 The
court stated, "'A trial judge should err on the side of caution by
dismissing, rather than trying to rehabilitate, biased jurors ... .'"52
The court held that after a juror states that he cannot be fair and
impartial and explains this position, the court should "limit further
questions to clarification of the answer. Neither the court nor the
parties should incessantly interrogate the juror in a manner calculated
only to elicit a response contrary to the one originally given.""'3
E.

Batson Challenges

In Harrison v. State,3" Harrison appealed his aggravated assault
conviction. Harrison alleged that the trial court erred by seating three
jurors the defense had struck. At trial, the State alleged that the
defense used all six peremptory strikes on Caucasian jurors because of
their race.355
The State challenged the strikes, and the defense
counsel gave the following explanations for the strikes: the first juror

348. Id. at 589-90, 574 S.E.2d at 665-66.
349. Id. at 588, 574 S.E.2d at 665.
350.. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 591, 574 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Walls, 250 Ga. at 260, 549 S.E.2d at 799).
353. Id. at 592, 574 S.E.2d at 667. Dissenting, Judge Andrews stated that he did not
believe that the trial judge manifestly abused his discretion and that the proper standard
should be whether the juror's opinion regarding the guilt or innocence is so fixed and
definite that he or she is unable to set that opinion aside based on the evidence and court
instructions.
A potential juror's doubts as to his or her own impartiality or reservations about
his or her ability to set aside personal experiences do not require the court to
strike the juror, as the judge is uniquely positioned to observe the juror's
demeanor and thereby to evaluate his or her capacity to render an impartial
verdict.
Id. at 596, 574 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting Brown v. State, 243 Ga. App. 632, 633, 534 S.E.2d
98, 100-01 (2000)) (Andrews, P.J., dissenting).
354. 257 Ga. App. 718, 572 S.E.2d 4 (2002).
355. Id. at 718, 572 S.E.2d at 4.
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was struck because she was "'a housewife and not a supervisor,' and had
not worked outside the home." 56 The second juror was struck because
he had worked as a supervisor; the third juror was struck because she
had medical training and had worked in the emergency room on trauma
cases. The trial judge found that the explanations were not race-neutral,
disallowed the strikes, and seated the jurors. 57 The court of appeals
disagreed and found error, holding that the explanations were raceneutral under the appropriate standard of facial validity. 58
The court stated that the trial court should have continued with step
three of the Batson inquiry and analyzed the persuasiveness of the
defense's explanations.3 59 The court ruled that step three was the
appropriate time for the court to analyze whether the explanations are
implausible or fantastic: "'[T]o say that a trial judge may choose to
disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different
from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two
when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious.'" 360 Defendant
was held to have been tried before an illegally constituted jury. 6'
In Brown v. State, 6 defendant, convicted of voluntary manslaughter
and aggravated assault, alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in
denying his Batson objection to the State's striking an African-American
juror."
The court of appeals used the three-step process of (1)
whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge made a prima facie
case showing racial discrimination, (2) whether the striker gave a raceneutral explanation, and (3) whether the striker's opponent proved
discriminatory intent.3 6 The court of appeals held that the proscecutor's statement showed a race-based juror strike. 5
In Brown the State used four of five peremptory strikes to strike
African-Americans from a panel made of forty-three percent AfricanAmericans and fifty-seven percent Caucasians. Finding that the defense
made a prima facie showing, the trial court examined the State's reasons
for the strike. The State struck the juror because the juror's family
moved from a high crime area, and the juror felt the system was racially

356. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 5.
357. Id. at 718-19, 572 S.E.2d at 5.
358. Id.

359. Id.
360. Id. (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).
361. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 6.

362.
363.
364.
365.

256 Ga. App. 209, 568 S.E.2d 62 (2002).
Id. at 209, 568 S.E.2d at 62-63.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 63.
Id. at 210, 568 S.E.2d at 63.
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prejudiced."'
The State felt that such a belief by the juror was
"'particularly relevant when the party who is saying the system is
prejudiced based on race is the same race as the defendant.'"36 7 The
court of appeals held that the State's own explanation demonstrated a
discriminatory purpose.3"
In another case dealing with Batson issues,369 the supreme court
held that no error occurred when the trial court denied defendant's
Batson challenge.3 7 ° In Daniels v. State,37 ' the defense made a prima
facie case of racial -discrimination. 7 ' The State explained that the
struck jurors all had close friends or family that had been either
mistreated or falsely accused of crimes by the State. 7 3 The trial court
found this explanation race-neutral and the appellate court agreed. 74
Although the court of appeals held that Daniels had established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination, Daniels did not make a countershowing to the State's race-neutral reasons for the strikes. 73
In White v.State,3 76 the court of appeals examined the "similarly
situated" sub-issue of a Batson challenge.3 77 Defendant alleged that
the trial court's denial of his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory
strike of an African-American was error. The panel included two
African-Americans jurors. The State did not challenge the male AfricanAmerican juror, but the State did challenge the female African-American
juror. The defense raised a Batson issue.378
The State explained that it struck the juror because of employmentrelated reasons and not racial reasons.3 79 The prosecutor further
explained that "he thought that people in artistic or cosmetic professions
80
have a different slant."M
Based
on this explanation, the trial court
38
denied defendant's challenge. '

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id. at 209-10, 568 S.E.2d at 62-63.
Id. at 210, 568 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting trial record).
Id.
Daniels v. State, 276 Ga. 632, 580 S.E.2d 221 (2003).
Id. at 633, 580 S.E.2d at 223.
276 Ga. 632, 580 S.E.2d 221 (2003).
Id. at 634, 580 S.E.2d at 223.
Id.
Id. at 633, 580 S.E.2d at 223.
Id. at 634, 580 S.E.2d at 224.
258 Ga. App. 546, 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002).
Id. at 546-47, 574 S.E.2d at 630.
Id. at 549, 574 S.E.2d at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal defendant contended that he had carried his burden of
proving that the race-neutral reason given by the State was a pretext.
Defendant argued that the State did not strike similarly situated white
female jurors. One of these white female jurors was a part-time chorus
instructor, and the other was a studio operator." 2
The appellate court stated, "'The opponent of the strike may carry
[the] burden ... by showing that similarly situated jurors of another
race were not struck.'"383 The court determined that the two jurors
relied on by defendant were not similarly situated with the challenged
juror."'
Thus, a part-time chorus instructor who "primarily" sold
carpet and a homemaker who operated a studio in the past are not
similarly situated to a full-time dance instructor. 5
86
The court of appeals, in Shelton v. State,"
held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by granting the State's reverse Batson
motion. 387 Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine. The State
challenged three defense strikes which excluded white males.88 The
court of appeals held that defendant's strike explanations were facially
neutral but held that the explanations were neither reasonably specific
nor related to the trial case. 8 9
The explanations held by the court to be facially neutral but not
reasonably specific or related to the case were the following: (1) working
for a county water department, and, thus, having a connection with the
case because Cobb County was prosecuting, (2) being in the Army for
four years and being married to a corporate executive, and (3) being
involved in a collections case and thus actively seeking and pursuing
litigation.3" The court agreed with the trial court that these explanations had no "bearing on a prosecution for selling cocaine. " "'
In contrast, the same court, in Ware v. State,392 viewed the issue
differently.393 Ware was convicted of armed robbery. On appeal, he
alleged that the trial court erred in refusing his Batson challenge to the

382. Id. at 549-50, 574 S.E.2d at 631-32.
383. Id. at 549, 574 S.E.2d at 632 (quoting Morris v. State, 246 Ga. App. 260, 262, 540
S.E.2d 244, 246 (2000)).
384. Id. at 550, 574 S.E.2d at 632.
385. Id.
386. 257 Ga. App. 890, 572 S.E.2d 401 (2002).
387. Id. at 890, 572 S.E.2d at 403.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 891, 572 S.E.2d at 404.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 892, 572 S.E.2d at 404.
392. 258 Ga. App. 706, 574 S.E.2d 898 (2002).
393. Id. at 707-08, 574 S.E.2d at 899.
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State's striking three African-American women.
The prosecutor
explained that she struck the jurors because they were unemployed. 94
The court of appeals concluded that the State could properly strike an
unemployed juror because 395the reason for the strike was "concrete,
tangible and race-neutral."
F

Sentencing

In Rogers v. State, 96 the court considered a mental retardation issue
in a death penalty murder case. 97 In Rogers the defendant was
convicted of murder. His death sentence was affirmed. Defendant then
filed a petition for state habeas corpus and sought a jury trial on the
issue of mental retardation. 98
The habeas court decided that a genuine issue of fact about mental
retardation existed.
Before the jury trial on petitioner's mental
retardation occurred, however, the petitioner wrote a letter to the trial
court and asked for dismissal of the proceeding. The trial court held a
hearing during which the petitioner stated that he was not mentally
retarded. The trial court found that the petitioner knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial on the issue. The next
month, with new counsel, petitioner sought to set aside the dismissal
and withdraw his waiver. Before the court ruled on the motion,
however, the petitioner wrote another letter asking for a dismissal of the
mental retardation trial. The trial court again found a waiver of the
right to a trial on mental retardation.399
The appellate court held that because petitioner's trial for a capital
crime was before July 1, 1988, 4 o once the habeas corpus court found
a genuine issue regarding his mental retardation, that issue had to be
thoroughly reviewed and passed upon and was no longer subject to
waiver."' The court held that contrary to the State's contention, the
trial court was not authorized to resolve the matter by finding that the

394. Id. at 707, 574 S.E.2d at 900.
395. Id. at 708, 574 S.E.2d at 900.
396. 276 Ga. 67, 575 S.E.2d 879 (2003).
397. Id. at 67, 575 S.E.2d at 880.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 68, 575 S.E.2d at 881.
400. Georgia defendants tried after July 1, 1988, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 17-7-131,
are permitted to contend that they were mentally retarded at the time of the crime and to
present evidence of this retardation to the trier of fact. In capital cases, the trier is then
required to determine during the guilt-innocence phase whether the defendant is guilty but
mentally retarded. If the trier of fact so finds, the defendant cannot be executed. O.C.G.A.
§ 17-7-131 (1997).
401. Rogers, 276 Ga. at 69, 575 S.E.2d at 881.
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petitioner was not mentally retarded.4 °2 Using the definition of mental
retardation in O.C.G.A. section 17-7-131,403 a jury would have to decide
the issue.40 4 The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings, including a jury trial on the
issue of mental retardation.4 5
Dissenting, Justice Carley concluded that because defendant elected
to waive his right, "the only issue before [the supreme court] was
whether he was authorized to do sO."406 Justice Carley believed that
defendant could and did waive his right to a jury trial.40 7 Also, Justice
Carley determined that "the trial court ... properly addressed and
resolved the issue of [defendant's] alleged mental retardation."40 8
In Keller v. State,4 9 the trial court, after the jury's verdict of guilty,
entered a written judgment of conviction and sentence on all but one
count of a multi-count indictment.4 " The supreme court held that
defendant's case was not ripe for appeal until a sentence had been
entered on each count of the indictment that was the subject of the trial
because a criminal case is not final, but is pending, until the court
enters a written judgment of conviction and sentence on each count. 41'
In Keller defendant filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial
court's entry of a written sentence on the last count of the jury's
verdict. 412 The court, therefore, held that his4 13appeal was timely and
that the appellate court erred in dismissing it.

Keller is noteworthy because the supreme court has clearly extended
the rules set forth in Littlejohn v. State41 4 and Crolley v. State.415 In
those cases, a one-count indictment required the court to enter one
sentence.4" The extension of the Littlejohn and Crolley rules is
evidenced in Keller in the court's statement that the "principle of those

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id. at 70, 575 S.E.2d at 882.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131.
Rogers, 276 Ga. at 70, 575 S.E.2d at 882.
Id. at 69-70, 575 S.E.2d at 881-82.
Id. at 70, 575 S.E.2d at 882 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
275 Ga. 680, 571 S.E.2d 806 (2002).
Id. at 680-81, 571 S.E.2d at 807.
Id. at 681, 571 S.E.2d 807-08. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) (1995 & Supp. 2003).
Keller, 275 Ga. at 681, 571 S.E.2d at 808.
Id.
185 Ga. App. 31, 363 S.E.2d 327 (1987).
182 Ga. App. 2, 354 S.E.2d 864 (1987).
Keller, 275 Ga. at 680-81, 571 S.E.2d at 807.
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cases applies with equal force to cases such as Keller's in which multiple
counts of an indictment are tried together."41 '
G.

First Offender

In Cook v. State,"8 defendant, a seventeen-year-old boy, was convicted by a jury of the simple battery of his father." 9 Defendant asked for
first offender treatment, but the trial court refused, stating:
Mr. Cook, you have lost your chance for first offender. Even when it
was pointed out to you that the jury was split four to two in favor of
conviction, with two jurors indicating they could change their minds,
you still maintained your desire to get a jury verdict and you did. So
that's of your own making, and you will live with that.42
The court of appeals, relying on solid precedent, remanded the case for
new sentencing.4 ' The trial court is required to exercise discretion in
granting first offender status, and an inflexible rule is not approved. 2
Refusing first offender status to one who has demanded a jury trial is
not an acceptable exercise of discretion.4 23
Similarly, the court of appeals vacated and remanded a case for a new
sentence based on the trial court's adoption of an inflexible rule
governing first offender status in Wilcox v. State.424 Defendant pleaded
guilty to armed robbery and kidnapping. He requested first offender
status, but the trial court was inflexible and refused to consider first
offender status for the crime of armed robbery.425
Additionally, the court of appeals has held that the request for first
offender status must be made at trial, or the argument is waived.42
H.

Probation
The court of appeals, in Dickey v. State,42 7 tackled an issue that
neither a Georgia appellate court nor the United States Supreme Court
had addressed: whether probation may be revoked for failure to make
restitution when the probationer bargained for the restitution require-

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 681, 571 S.E.2d at 807.
256 Ga. App. 353, 568 S.E.2d 482 (2002).
Id. at 353, 568 S.E.2d at 482-83.
Id. at 353-54, 568 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 355, 568 S.E.2d at 483-84.
Id. at 354, 568 S.E.2d at 483.
Id.
257 Ga. App. 519, 521, 571 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2002).
Id. at 520, 571 S.E.2d at 513.
See Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 570 S.E.2d 437 (2002).
257 Ga. App. 190, 570 S.E.2d 634 (2002).
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ment" s In Dickey the defendant agreed to a negotiated plea of ten
years probation plus the payment of restitution to avoid incarceration.
Defendant then failed to pay the restitution, and the trial court revoked
his probation. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in revoking
restitution because no evidence showed
his probation for failure to pay
429
that he willfully failed to pay.
The court of appeals, affirming the trial court's revocation of probation,
decided that defendant was not without fault.43 ° The court stated that
when defendant agreed to the plea bargain, he entered into a contract,
and any doubts about his ability to make the payment should have been
addressed with the other parties before everyone agreed to the
terms.43 ' Defendant's "silence, when he should have spoken, and his
ultimate breach, [made] him culpable." 32
The court reviewed the plea agreement and decided that defendant
had acknowledged that he was aware of his rights and that he was
pleading guilty in exchange for a specified sentence.4 33 The agreement
also stated that defendant had freely and voluntarily executed the
document after consulting with his attorney. The4 trial court sentenced
Dickey in accordance with the plea agreement.13
After entering into the negotiated plea, defendant failed to make the
required and agreed upon restitution payments. Defendant's probation
officer petitioned the court to revoke or modify his probation. At the
revocation hearing, Dickey stipulated that he had not paid the required
restitution. However, Dickey argued that restitution was not paid
because he was incarcerated. Dickey also argued that the court was not
permitted to revoke probation based on inability to pay.435 Defendant
based his argument on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bearden v. Georgia,46 in which
[t]he Court recognized that differential treatment of indigent defendants in revoking probation may violate the equal protection clause
and that the fundamental unfairness of revoking probation based on an
indigent's failure to pay a fine raises due process concerns. Thus, "if
the State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 190, 570 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 190-91, 570 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 192, 570 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id. (citing Gilbert v. State, 245 Ga. App. 544, 546, 538 S.E.2d 104, 106 (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 190-91, 570 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 191, 570 S.E.2d at 635.
461 U.S. 660 (1983).
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adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter
4 imprison a person
solely because he lacked the resources to pay it." 11
On the other hand, the State can imprison a defendant who willfully
refuses to pay a fine or restitution.4 8 The trier of fact should examine
the reason for the probationer's nonpayment, and if the evidence shows
no fault by the probationer, then his probation should not be revoked." 9
Applying the Bearden standard, the court of appeals held that Dickey
was not without fault because he agreed to the plea bargain, entered
into a contract, knew the schedule and amount of the required payThe court
ments, and knew his ability to make the payments." 0
emphasized that no evidence showed the defendant expressed any doubt
about his ability to make the payments before everyone agreed to the
plea terms. 44 '
4
The trial court in
The court distinguished Dickey from Bearden."
Bearden unilaterally imposed the probated sentence, fines, and
restitution as an alternative to incarceration."' However, the probationer in Dickey participated in the negotiatations and agreed to the
probated sentence and restitution payments to avoid incarceration. 444
The distinction is crucial and results in the rule that a probationer
cannot be deprived of his freedom solely because he was unable to pay
the restitution, except when a probationer secures his freedom by5
negotiating and agreeing to an agreement that requires restitution."
If the probationer does not follow the negotiated agreement, a court may
properly sentence him according to the terms of the agreement.'
The court of appeals, in State v. Huckeba,47 reversed the trial
court's decision that, under O.C.G.A. section 42-8-38(a),4" only a
probation violation that occurred within the probationary term could be
the subject matter of a probation revocation petition. 4 9 In Huckeba

437.
at 667).
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Wilcox, 257 Ga. App. at 191-92, 570 S.E.2d at 635-36 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S.
Id. at 192, 570 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191-92, 570 S.E.2d at 635-36.
Id. at 192-93, 570 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id. at 193, 570 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
258 Ga. App. 627, 574 S.E.2d 856 (2002).
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-38(a) (1997).
Huckeba, 258 Ga. App. at 628, 574 S.E.2d at 858.
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the defendant pleaded guilty to three felony counts of violating the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act 45° in 1996 and was sentenced to
five years incarceration followed by five years of probation. The
probationary term was set to begin in June 2001. Huckeba was paroled
approximately four months before his scheduled probationary period.
Almost immediately, in March 2001, he was arrested for another felony
violation of the Controlled Substances Act.4 5'
The State filed a petition for revocation. The trial court denied the
petition, interpreting O.C.G.A. section 42-8-38(a) 452 as pertaining to
the probationer's actions within the probation period. Thus, the trial
court found it had no authority to consider the State's petition because
the violation of probation occurred before the probation period began.453
The court of appeals reversed, relying on the rule that refraining from
violating any criminal laws was a condition for the probationary period's
imposition and a condition to remaining on probation.4 54 The court
held that it did not matter that the condition of probation was violated
before the probationary period actually began. 455 The commission of
another felony offense violated the court's sentence and a condition
under which probation was imposed. 4 6 The holding encompasses an
"implicit condition": when a defendant commits a felony while under a
probationary sentence, even if it is committed before the effective date
of the sentence's probationary period, the sentencing court is authorized
to revoke the defendant's probation for violation of a condition implicit
in every suspended or probationary sentence. 45 This implicit condition
is that the probationer, while under such sentence, will not commit
another criminal offense.45 5
I.

Double Jeopardy

The court of appeals, in Puplampu v. State,459 held that a trial was
improperly terminated and reversed the judgment of the trial court,
which denied defendant's double jeopardy plea.46 ° The bench trial
record revealed that after the first witness was sworn in in this speeding

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
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460.

See O.C.G.A. § 16-30-20 (2003).
Huckeba, 258 Ga. App. at 627-28, 574 S.E.2d at 857.
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-38(a).
Huckeba, 258 Ga. App. at 629, 574 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 628, 574 S.E.2d at 858.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628-29, 574 S.E.2d at 858.
Id.
257 Ga. App. 5, 570 S.E.2d 83 (2002).
Id. at 6, 570 S.E.2d at 84.
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violation case, but before the solicitor general began his questioning, the
solicitor general informed the court that he did not have the documents
necessary to lay the foundation for the admission of the State's laser
speeding device evidence. Over objection from defense counsel, the trial
judge reset the case to give the solicitor general time to obtain the
documents." 1
One day before the second trial, Puplampu filed a motion for plea of
double jeopardy. On the date of the second trial, the case was set to
begin before a different judge. The case was called, and defendant
entered a plea of double jeopardy. Following a hearing on the issue, the
court denied the plea because the court was not convinced that jeopardy
had attached in the case. Defendant appealed.4 6 2
The appellate court quoted the Georgia Constitution: "[N]o person
shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same
offense except when a new trial has been granted after conviction or in
The court applied its decision in Wilson v.
case of mistrial."46 3
State," in which the court held that "[t]he appellate standard of
review of a grant or denial of a double jeopardy plea in bar is whether,
after reviewing the trial court's oral and written rulings as a whole, the
trial court's findings support its conclusion."165 The court analyzed
O.C.G.A. [section] 16-1-8(a)(2)[,"8 which] provides that "[a] prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same
crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution
... [wlas terminated improperly... in a trial before a court without
a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were
rendered by the trier of facts.... ,467
Further, the court, applying O.C.G.A. section 16-1-8(e), 468 set out the
following situations of improper trial termination:
"(1) The accused consents to the termination or waives by motion to
dismiss or other affirmative action his right to object to the termination; or (2) [tlhe trial court finds that the termination is necessary
because: (A) [i]t is physically impossible to proceed with the trial; (B)
[p]rejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom makes it impossible to

461. Id. at 5, 570 S.E.2d at 84.
462. Id.
463. Id.; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 18 (1998).
464. 229 Ga. App. 455, 494 S.E.2d 267 (1997).
465. Puplampu, 257 Ga. App. at 5-6, 570 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Wilson, 229 Ga. App.
at 455, 494 S.E.2d at 268).
466. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(a)(2) (2003).
467. Puplampu, 257 Ga. App. at 6, 570 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting O.C.G.A. §16-1-8(a)(2)).
468. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(e).
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proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant; (C) [t]he jury
is unable to agree upon a verdict;
469 or (D) [fialse statements of a juror on
voir dire prevent a fair trial."
The court of appeals held that the termination of Puplampu's first
trial after the first witness was sworn in and before findings were
rendered was clearly not a proper basis for terminating a criminal bench
trial at that stage of the proceedings. 470 The court distinguished this
set of facts from "a case of a continuance, where the trial would simply
be recessed for a brief time and then continued before the same trier of
facts."4 71 The court held that the trial was improperly terminated and
reversed the judgment of the trial court.472
In State v. Perkins, 73 the court split into three camps, producing a
concurring opinion and a dissent.4 74 The State appealed a Whitfield
County Superior Court order which sustained Perkins's plea of former
jeopardy and barred further prosecution.47 5
In Perkins the defendant was in an automobile collision that resulted
in a death. Perkins was charged in separate citations with vehicular
homicide and reckless driving. Although the deputy wrote "Superior
Court" on the reckless driving citation, the Whitfield County Probate
Court processed the citation instead of binding it over. Deputies took
Perkins from the jail to the probate court to answer the reckless driving
charge. Without benefit of counsel, the eighteen-year-old defendant
pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted of the offense.47 6
Subsequently, the district attorney indicted Perkins for reckless
driving and felony vehicular homicide. At arraignment, Perkins filed a
plea in bar on former jeopardy grounds.477 The district attorney, citing
O.C.G.A. section 40-6-376(d),478 responded with a motion to set aside
Perkins's prior reckless driving conviction.479 The trial court sustained
the plea in bar because it found that defendant's "reckless driving
conviction [was] a lesser included offense of the vehicular homicide
offense for which he was indicted."480 The State appealed.4 "'
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470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Puplampu, 257 Ga. App. at 6, 570 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(e)).
Id.
Id.
Id., 570 S.E.2d at 85.
256 Ga. App. 855, 569 S.E.2d 910 (2002).
Id. at 855-59, 569 S.E.2d at 901-14.
Id. at 866, 569 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-376(d) (2001).
Perkins, 256 Ga. App. at 855, 569 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.

168

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

On appeal, "[tihe State d[id] not contest that, but for the application
of [O.C.G.A. section] 40-6-376,4s2 the instant prosecution would be
barred on former jeopardy grounds." 3 Instead, the State argued that
according to O.C.G.A. section 40-6-376(d), defendant's "reckless driving
conviction [was] 'null and void'"8 because the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to try defendant on the felony vehicular homicide charge,
and the probate court also lacked jurisdiction on the underlying lesser
included misdemeanor.
The State, therefore, argued that double
jeopardy protection was not triggered."'
The court of appeals held that the plain language of section 40-6376(d) did not support the State's argument.4 6 The statute provided:
No court, other than a court havingjurisdictionto try a person charged
with a violation of [O.C.GA.] [slection 40-6-393,4 v shall have jurisdiction over any offense arising under the laws of this state or the
ordinances of any political subdivision thereof, which offense arose out
of the same conduct which led to said person's being charged with a
violation of... [slection 40-6-393 and any judgment rendered by such
court shall be null and void.'
The court determined that because "the Whitfield County Probate
Court [had] jurisdiction to try misdemeanor vehicular homicide cases
charged under [O.C.G.A. section] 40-6-393(b),[4891 the probate court
was, by definition, included among the courts that 'hav[e] jurisdiction to
try a [defendant] charged with [violating O.C.G.A. section] 40-6393.'"4 The court of appeals noted that the Georgia legislature made
no distinction between misdemeanor and felony grades of vehicular
homicide under section 40-6-393 when it drafted section 40-6-376(d).49 '
Thus, the court reasoned, by its plain language, section 40-6-376(d) did
not divest the Whitfield County Probate Court of jurisdiction to try
Perkins on the reckless driving charge.492 The court, therefore, held
that the "conviction was not 'null and void,' and the trial court properly
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482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-376(d).
Perkins, 256 Ga. App. at 855, 569 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id. at 855-56, 569 S.E.2d at 911-12.
Id. at 856, 569 S.E.2d at 912.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393 (2001).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-6-376 (d)).
See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(b) (2001).
Perkins, 256 Ga. App. at 856, 569 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-6-376(d)).
Id.
Id.
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4 93
sustained [defendant's] plea in bar."

In his concurring opinion, joined by Judge Smith, Judge Pope stated
that although he was "constrained to agree with .. .the majority, [he

did] not believe that the legislature intended the result here."4 94 Also,
Judge Pope
[could not] agree with the dissent that the statute as written can be
construed to effectuate that intent. Certainty of legislative intent
cannot compensate for omissions or oversights in statutory drafting-we must abide by the statute as it is plainly written... and we
cannot rewrite the statute to make such a distinction. This is a job for
the General Assembly, not the courts.495
In his dissent, joined by Judge Ruffin, Judge Eldridge, relied on
O.C.G.A. section 1-3-1(a)4 96 and argued that the statute's plain language demands the construction that the legislature obviously intended
when the law was enacted twenty years ago.497 Judge Eldridge opined
further that section 40-6-376(d) was enacted to prevent the very scenario
presented by Perkins.48" As evidenced from the statute's plain meaning, the legislature intended that only a court with the jurisdiction to try
a person on the vehicular homicide with which he is charged should be
able to dispose of the offense underlying that charge.4" Judge Eldridge reasoned that "[t]he plain language of [O.C.G.A. section] 40-6376(d) goes to a court's ability to try a person who has been charged with
a vehicular homicide violation. The language in the statute twice
referring to a person charged with a violation cannot simply be ignored
as mere surplusage." °° The dissent discovered incongruity, not in the
statute's language, but in the majority's interpretation.5 1
Judge Eldridge further observed that the statute's plain language
divests a probate court of jurisdiction over an underlying misdemeanor
offense when a person has been charged with a felony violation of section
40-6-393.502

Judge Eldridge opined that the probate court had no

493. Id.
494. Id. (Pope, P.J., concurring).
495. Id. (Pope, P.J., concurring).
496. O.C.G.A § 1-3-1(a) (2000). Section 1-3-1(a) states, "The initial rule of statutory
construction is to look to the legislative intent and to construe statutes to effectuate that
intent." Id.
497. Perkins, 256 Ga. App. at 857, 569 S.E.2d at 912 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
498. Id. (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
499. Id. (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
500. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 913 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
501. Id. at, 857-58, 569 S.E.2d at 913 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
502. Id. at 858, 569 S.E.2d at 913 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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authority to dispose of the reckless driving offense because it did not
have jurisdiction to try defendant on the charge of felony vehicular
homicide.5 °3
The supreme court granted certiorari5 °4 and held that the dissenting
judges in the appellate court correctly interpreted section 40-6-376(d). 5 The court held that the "determinative factor" was whether the
vehicular homicide charge was a felony that would fall under section 406-393(a) or a misdemeanor that would fall under subsection (b) of
O.C.G.A. section 40-13-21.506 The distinction between the misdemeanor and felony grades determines whether section 40-6-376(d) applies to
a probate court.01 7 The court determined that in Perkins, defendant
was charged with felony vehicular homocide, and the probate court did
not have jurisdiction."' The court held that the code section's jurisdiction restrictions over underlying offenses applied.0 s Properly interpreting section 40-6-376(d), the court held that the appellate court would
have had to hold that the judgment entered by the probate court of the
reckless driving charge was "null and void." "10 The supreme court held
that the trial court erred because it interpreted the statute
incorrectly,
51
and the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court. '

In another case with a double jeopardy issue, Johnson v.State,"2 the
court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion when it
refused defendant's request to accept the jury's unanimous verdict on
three of four counts when the jury was deadlocked on the fourth
count.513 The court of appeals found that a retrial on those three
counts was barred under the double jeopardy clause.514
The record reflects that after the evidence was presented, the jury
announced three separate times that it had reached a unanimous verdict
on three counts but was deadlocked on the fourth. When the State
moved for a mistrial, Johnson's counsel made a motion that the trial
court receive the verdicts on the three counts. The State concurred with
defendant's motion. The trial court entered a mistrial on all four counts,

503. Id. at 858-59, 569 S.E.2d at 914 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
504. State v. Perkins, 176 Ga. 621, 580 S.E.2d 523 (2003).
505. Id. at 622-23, 580 S.E.2d at 524-25.
506. Id. at 622, 580 S.E.2d at 525 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-13-21(b) (2001)).
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 623, 580 S.E.2d at 526.
511. Id. at 621, 580 S.E.2d at 524.
512. 256 Ga. App. 730, 569 S.E.2d 625 (2002).
513. Id. at 730, 569 S.E.2d at 626.
514. Id.
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noting the lengthy time the jury had taken to deliberate compared to the
short time it took the parties to present evidence. Defendant made a
motion to dismiss because of a double jeopardy plea. The trial court
denied the motion, and defendant appealed.5 15
The court of appeals, citing Bair v.State,516 stated that defendant
was entitled to receive any unanimous verdict reached by the jury
impaneled and sworn to hear the charges against him.517 The court

also noted that the State concurred in Johnson's request to receive the
jury's verdict on the three decided counts.51 Additionally, the court
noted that the trial court "'could easily have followed the less drastic
alternative of accepting the jury's verdict on the decided counts and
declaring a mistrial only on the ... undecided count.'" 1' 9

The court

held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial on
the three charges adjudicated by the jury and that any retrial of these
three charges would be barred from retrial under the double jeopardy
clause. 2 °
In another case also named Johnson v. State,5 2 1 the court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in its denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds after the trial court's sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial.5 2 The record reveals that the defense
attorney interrupted the judge on several occasions, even though he
received a warning from the judge on each occasion.523 Also, the record
indicates that the defense attorney called the prosecutor "'an absolute
liar'"524 during an intense argument that took place in front of the
jury. The trial judge feared that defendant could no longer receive a fair
trial because of the defense counsel's behavior so the trial judge, sua
sponte, declared a mistrial. The State did not object to the mistrial, but
defendant did object and informed the trial court that defendant desired
for the trial to continue. The judge overruled defendant's objection, and
the defense attorney filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy

515. Id. at 731, 569 S.E.2d at 626.
516. 250 Ga. App. 226, 551 S.E.2d 84 (2001).
517. Johnson, 256 Ga. App. at 732, 551 S.E.2d at 627 (citing Bair, 250 Ga. App. at 226,
551 S.E.2d at 86).
518. Id. at 731, 569 S.E.2d at 626.
519. Id. at 732, 569 S.E.2d at 627 (citing Bair, 250 Ga. App. at 227, 551 S.E.2d at 86).
520. Id. (quoting Bair, 250 Ga. App. at 227, 551 S.E.2d at 86). The appellate court did
find that the State could retry the defendant on the DUI charge. Id.
521. 258 Ga. App. 33, 572 S.E.2d 669 (2002).
522. Id. at 33, 572 S.E.2d at 670.
523. Id.
524. Id.
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grounds. The trial court denied the motion.5 25
After denying defendant's motion, the trial court interviewed jurors
about their reactions to the defense attorney's trial behavior. The
interview transcript, filed under seal, did not reveal that the jurors
would have been unable to decide the case fairly because of the defense
attorney's actions.526
On appeal, the defense alleged that the trial court improperly declared
a mistrial and erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds.5 27 Agreeing with defendant, the appellate court
quoted the Georgia Constitution's prohibition against being put "in
jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense except in
the case of a new trial that is granted after conviction or in the case of
mistrial,"5 2 and held that double jeopardy "does not bar retrial of a
criminal defendant following declaration of a mistrial over his objection
where there is 'manifest necessity' for declaration of the mistrial or the
'ends of public justice' would be defeated by allowing the trial to
continue."529
However, outside of such extreme circumstances, "the defendant has
a right to be tried once and for all for the offense, and.., consequently
where a mistrial is granted because of prejudice caused to the
defendant, the defendant has the right to object to a mistrial (and thus
insist on this trial) despite any such prejudice to himself.... o
The court noted that although the trial court "'declared a mistrial
based on a pattern of abrasive, unprofessional and disrespectful conduct
by defense counsel ....
which had alienated and upset the jury to the
extent that the defendant could not receive a fair trial, ' 531 the record

did not clearly reveal that the jurors would not have been able to make
a fair decision despite defendant's attorney's conduct. 3 2 The court
further noted that the trial court stated that the mistrial was not
declared because of prejudice to the State and that the State had failed
in its responsibility to raise any objection to the mistrial. 3 Further,
the court opined that, "[wihile the trial court may have believed that

525. Id.
526. Id. at 34, 572 S.E.2d at 670.
527. Id.
528. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 18 (1998)).
529. Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 256, 257, 485 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1997)).
530. Id. at 35, 572 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting State v. Abdi, 162 Ga. App. 20, 21, 288 S.E.2d
772, 774 (1982)).
531. Id. (emphasis supplied).
532. Id.
533. Id.
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[defense counsel's] actions caused prejudice to [defendant], this [belief
did] not overshadow [defendant's] right to be tried once for the [charged
offense]." 5 4

534.

Id.
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